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Federal Banks and Federal Jurisdiction in the Progressive Era: 
A Case Study of Smith v. K.C. Title & Trust Co. 
 
This article probes the anatomy and context of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. 
K.C. Title & Trust Co.1   
 
Charles E. Smith, a stockholder in the Trust Company, filed a bill in equity in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.  He sought an injunction preventing 
the company, its directors, and managers from using corporate funds to purchase tax-exempt 
bonds issued by Federal Land Banks or Joint Stock Land Banks, established under the Farm 
Loan Act of 1916 and supervised by the Farm Loan Board.  His theory was that the Trust 
Company’s charter permitted investments only in lawful securities—a criterion these bonds 
failed to meet because the 1916 Act in general and tax exemptions for the bonds in particular 
were unjustified under any of Congress’ enumerated powers.  The district court rejected Smith’s 
contentions on the merits and dismissed the bill.  The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by 
Justice Day, upholding the Act in all particulars.  Justice Holmes dissented on the ground that the 
district court had acted without jurisdiction.  Justice McReynolds joined Holmes’ dissent.  
Justice Brandeis did not participate.   
 
The Smith case is an old chestnut in the law of federal courts, usually cited for its 
treatment of the district court’s original subject matter jurisdiction.  None of the parties raised the 
jurisdiction issue; Justice Day addressed it sua sponte.  Day explained that the district court had 
acted properly under § 24 of the Revised Judicial Code, the precursor of the modern federal-
question jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Inasmuch as the case implicated the validity 
of a federal statute, he said, it arose “under the Constitution.”2   The Supreme Court itself then 
had immediate appellate jurisdiction under § 238 of the Code, which permitted the circuit court 
of appeals to be bypassed when the constitutionality of a “law of the United States” was drawn 
into question.3  In dissent, Justice Holmes invoked his own opinion for the Court in a previous 
                                                 
1 255 U.S. 180 (1921).   
2 In relevant part, § 24 read this way: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction … [of] 
all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, … where the matter in controversy 
exceeds … three thousand dollars, and … arises under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”  REV. STAT. § 991, U.S. 
COMP. STAT. 1918, p. 128.  Currently, § 1331 provides that district courts have original 
jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.” 
3 REV. STAT. § 1215, U.S. COMP. STAT. 1913, p. 510. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2421709 
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(and equally famous) case, American Well Works.4   In Well Works, Holmes had explained that a 
suit “arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”5  In Smith, he insisted, the “cause of 
action” was created by state law, and it followed that original federal jurisdiction was not 
established under § 24.   
For generations, the Court’s jurisdictional holding in Smith was acknowledged as 
authoritative, yet honored primarily in the breach—understandable perhaps in its own peculiar 
circumstances, but out of step with the general doctrine announced in Well Works and with the 
broader stream of precedents in point.6  Then, in the Grable case a few years ago,7 the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the result in Smith and offered a rationale for bringing this old case into the 
fold.  Briefly stated, the modern Court embraces what it takes to be Holmes’ general analysis of 
subject matter jurisdiction in federal-question cases, but recognizes exceptions that capture 
Smith.   
 
 To specialists, a thorough exploration of Smith is intrinsically worthwhile.  We need to 
know what we can about a decision that continues to figure in modern discussions of federal-
question jurisdiction.  To everybody else, an investigation of Smith sounds like a snooze.  It is 
not.  There is a wider, deeper story here worth the telling—a story about another time when 
national economic policy could be made and implemented in a way that appears strange (and 
sadly alien) today.  Members of Congress from both political parties could cooperate in the 
creation of public institutions to serve the social welfare at the expense of private corporations.  
Affected companies could ask the federal courts to protect their businesses in the name of the 
Constitution.  The courts could fashion a procedural framework for entertaining the 
constitutional challenge.  And the Supreme Court could easily validate the economic policy 
forged via democratic processes.   
There is some human interest in the Smith story.  For students of the Court, Holmes’ 
involvement is enough in itself.  But other colorful characters participated.  The shareholder, 
Smith, was represented by William Marshall Bullitt, formerly Solicitor General in the Taft 
Administration and one of the premier corporate litigators of his generation.  Bullitt was an 
                                                 
4 American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
5 Id. at 260. 
6 See, e.g., T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J.). 
7 Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
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extravagant personality whose avocation was the collection of rare books on mathematics and 
astronomy.8  It was said he could “say more words in a minute than any man in Kentucky.”9   
The Act was defended by no less a figure than Charles Evans Hughes, just off his 
unsuccessful run for the presidency.   Hughes represented Federal Land Banks, which joined the 
suit as intervenors.  The other two principal attorneys on the defense side were George 
Woodward Wickersham (the former Attorney General and a close friend of Bullitt’s from their 
days at the Justice Department)10 and William Gibbs McAdoo (the former Secretary of the 
Treasury under Wilson who married the boss’s daughter).11  Wickersham and McAdoo argued 
for independent intervenors, Federal Joint Stock Land Banks.  McAdoo also appeared for the 
United States as amicus curiae, signing the Government’s brief in the capacity of Special 
Assistant to the Attorney General.  
The battle of these giants of the American bar was the more exciting inasmuch as they 
joined issue on the merits of the constitutional questions and refused to be distracted by 
procedural obstacles.  Everyone involved wanted a definitive ruling that either cut Federal Land 
Banks and Joint Stock Banks out of the picture or removed the constitutional cloud that 
surrounded them.  This was a classic test case. The real interests backing the Smith suit were 
private mortgage lenders anxious that federally chartered banks would drive them out of 
business.  The real defendants were the intervenor federal banks whose validity was under attack.  
Those federal banks were meant to displace private mortgage banks, but had been unable to do 
so because their legal status, in particular their ability to sell tax-exempt bonds, was under 
suspicion.  Various attempts to reassure investors had been unsuccessful, and an authoritative 
decision upholding the Act had become a palpable necessity.  Millions were at stake (real money 
at the time), not to mention the stability of far-ranging economic arrangements tied to 
agriculture.   
The litigation in Smith provides a snapshot of another time in American history when the 
country was somehow more governable than it is now.  Generalization is dangerous, of course.  
There were lots of contradictory political themes in the Progressive Era.  But among them was a 
                                                 
8 MARK DAVIS, SOLICITOR GENERAL BULLITT 169-177 (2011). 
9 William Bullitt, Ex-U.S. Aide, Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1957, at 23.    
10 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 71 (reporting that Wickersham’s office was next to Bullitt’s and 
describing their close working and personal relationship).   
11 McAdoo’s wife was Woodrow Wilson’s daughter, Eleanor. JOHN J. BROESAMLE, WILLIAM 




discernible impulse to establish governmental instruments for advancing the public good.  There 
was an accompanying jurisprudence, which effectively allowed corporations to challenge federal 
social welfare legislation that reduced their profits.  Then again, once corporations gained a 
foothold in federal court, they could be unsuccessful on the merits when the judiciary sustained 
Congress’ decision to erect public substitutes for private business.   
No one thinks the Supreme Court was bent on a socialist agenda in the early years of the 
Twentieth Century—as though, if Congress had only chosen to displace private enterprise with 
public institutions, the Court would have been perfectly content and, into the bargain, would 
never have entertained the federal regulatory measures Congress in fact enacted and the Court in 
fact considered and struck down as the New Deal took shape.  There is no viable thesis that the 
Court was troubled only by impositions on private businesses, not their demise.  Yet in this 
instance at least, the Farm Loan Act of 1916 did introduce public entities Congress believed 
would better serve the common good, and the Supreme Court endorsed a means by which private 
corporations could launch a constitutional attack only to reject the challenge on the merits.   
Part I of this article first describes the conditions that gave rise to the Federal 
Government’s decision to establish federally chartered banks to foster rural credit and the 
politics surrounding the 1916 Act, then sketches the content of the Act and the interests it 
affected, and finally reviews the experience with federally chartered banks and the perceived 
threat to the private lenders roused to litigation.  The Act was a meaningful, bipartisan response 
to genuine concerns that the agriculture sector needed public support to realize its potential for 
the benefit of both farmers and others who would flourish along with them.  The opposition 
came from private financial institutions whose businesses would suffer.  The political process 
recognized the competing interests and forged a compromise.  Private banks remained 
dissatisfied and took their case to the courts.  
Part II explores the development of the test case, the choice of a shareholder suit as the 
vehicle, the selection of the nominal plaintiff and defendant, the legal arguments on both sides, 
and the litigation itself from the initial pleadings to the Supreme Court’s decision.  The suit in 
Smith was framed as a shareholder action to defuse three threshold questions: standing to appear 
in an Article III court, the district court’s jurisdiction in equity, and the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain an attack on the 1916 Act.  The case was plainly friendly, though fiercely 
argued on the merits.  The Court set aside Hughes’ contention that Congress could establish the 
new federal banks under its power to tax and spend for the general welfare and, instead, held that 
Congress could create the banks as a means of administering the Government’s own finances—
relying on dormant provisions inserted in the Act for the acknowledged purpose of insulating the 
banks from constitutional attack.  
 Part III takes up the question that divided Justice Day and Justice Holmes: the district 
court’s original subject matter jurisdiction.  The modern Court thinks Day held that jurisdiction 
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was established under § 24 because the substantive claim the shareholder advanced against the 
Trust Company was federal.  The Court thinks Holmes used the phrase “cause of action” as that 
phrase is typically employed today—namely, to describe a litigant’s entitlement to seek a judicial 
remedy on a claim rather than the claim itself.  Accordingly, the Court thinks Holmes objected to 
jurisdiction in Smith because, however the shareholder’s claim was characterized, his ability to 
sue came from state rather than federal law.  Recent scholarship demonstrates that, at the time, it 
was commonplace to find federal-question jurisdiction even though a plaintiff’s authority to 
pursue judicial relief rested on nonfederal grounds and that Holmes rejected any distinction 
between claims and the ability to enforce claims in court.  These insights do not necessarily 
threaten, but in some minds actually support, the modern Court’s understanding of what Day and 
Holmes meant.   
There is, however, an alternative reading of the opinions in Smith that better accounts for 
all we know about the case and its surrounds.  According to this alternative interpretation, both 
Day and Holmes used the phrase “cause of action” to refer to the shareholder’s substantive 
claim, and both agreed that jurisdiction turned on the nature of the claim without regard to any 
separable entitlement to seek a judicial remedy.  They disagreed about whether the claim the 
shareholder raised (a state claim borrowing its content from the Constitution) was truly federal 
for jurisdictional purposes.  This alternative interpretation does challenge the modern Court’s 
understanding of Smith.  Yet it does not suggest that the Court’s focus on a litigant’s authority to 
sue as the keystone to federal-question jurisdiction today is erroneous or unwise, only 
unsupported by anything Justice Holmes thought and wrote nearly a century ago.   
I. The Legislative Facts  
A. The Path to Legislation 
American agriculture underwent fundamental transformation during the Progressive Era.  
Farming had historically been a local affair, conducted on a small scale according to traditional 
techniques.  Land was plentiful and cheap, so there was little incentive to make farming efficient.  
Yet when the supply of land diminished early in the Twentieth Century, agriculture became more 
like any other business.  Farmers employed more sophisticated methods to improve their yields, 
adopted commercial practices that previously had been largely confined to manufacturing, and 
raised their sights to wider markets.12     
 In some respects, the evolution of farming was of a piece with so many other populist 
developments in the period—developments conventionally associated with greater power and 
improved conditions for common people.13  Yet the full story resists any single, tidy narrative.  
                                                 
12 George E. Putnam, The Land Credit Problem, 2 BULL. U. KAN. HUMAN. STUD. 7-17 (1916). 
13 E.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 118 (1968). 
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Historians do not agree on the best description of the changes in agriculture, far less on the 
principal contributing causes, less still on the consequences for farmers and the nation as a 
whole.  There is evidence that farming assumed new forms not (so much or, certainly, entirely) 
in response to popular social movements, but through the calculated, though disjointed, efforts of 
urban business interests to exploit agriculture.  Railroads, for example, promoted larger, more 
mechanized, and better funded farming operations to generate shipments of produce to hungry 
city dwellers.14    
 Innovations in agriculture were accompanied by new financial arrangements.   Farming 
had previously been carried on without significant debt.   In this period, farmers began to 
mortgage their land to private banks and life insurance companies in order to generate funds for 
equipment and expansion.  Many mortgage lenders in rural areas concentrated their activities in 
this direction, developing a new, specialized, and extremely lucrative farm loan industry.15  
Questions were raised about the capacity of private mortgage lending to support agriculture’s 
evolving needs.  It was commonly said that private banks and insurance companies loaned 
farmers too little, demanded repayment from farmers too soon, and, most important, charged 
farmers too much.16  Political sentiment coalesced around federal legislation that would free 
farmers from greedy lenders and ensure adequate financing for business-like farming operations 
from which so many hoped to prosper.17   
                                                 
14 ROY V. SCOTT, RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 36-55 
(6th ed. 1985); see W.W. Finley, The Railway and the Farmer, THE PROGRESSIVE FARMER, 
Feb. 17, 1912, at 5 (describing the symbiotic relation between the railroads and agriculture); 
MICHAEL P. MALONE, JAMES J. HILL: EMPIRE BUILDER OF THE NORTHWEST 89, 160, 196-199, 
254-262 (1996) (providing illustrations from Hill’s development of the Great Northern Railway). 
15 Robert Lynn Cox, Life Insurance Investments with Special Reference to Farm Mortgages, in 
77 THE STANDARD, Dec. 11, 1915, at 620 (reporting that banks held large numbers of farm 
mortgages by 1914 and that life insurance companies held even more).   
16 Robert J. Buckley, The Federal Farm-Loan Act, 25 J. POL. ECON. 129, 130-131 (1917); 
Myron T. Herrick, The Farmer and Finance, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1913, at 170; 
ARNE C. WIPRUD, THE FEDERAL FARM LOAN SYSTEM IN OPERATION 49-50, 76 (1921); 
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RURAL CREDITS, H.R. DOC. NO. 64-494, at 6 (1st Sess. 
1916) (asserting that farmers were charged “extortionate and inexcusable rates of interest” 
regardless of usury statutes and “a decent regard for human necessities.”) [hereinafter REPORT ON 
RURAL CREDITS].  Accord 53 CONG. REC. app., at 1293-1294 (1916) (statement of Rep. 
Tillman).   
17 Buckley, supra note 16, at 131-132 (explaining that rural credit was a national issue calling for 
national policy); REPORT ON RURAL CREDITS, supra note 16, at 6 (explaining that farming was 
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 In 1914, private banks formed the Farm Mortgage Bankers Association to respond to 
what they regarded as false accusations.  Yet by then the question was no longer whether 
Congress would act, but how, and the FMBA focused primary attention on a lobbying campaign 
to influence inevitable legislation.  In its original statement of principles, the FMBA disclaimed 
opposition to federal intervention per se and, indeed, formally endorsed the creation of federally 
chartered land banks—but only so long as new federal banks were not authorized to use public 
funds to make or guarantee low-interest loans to farmers.18   
 The campaign for a federal program also defies generalization.  Institutions and 
organizations frequently shifted their stated goals, constantly jockeying for influence.  Most of 
the time (but not always), farm organizations like the National Grange and the National Farmers 
Union promoted direct government loans at low rates.19  Most (but not all) agricultural 
publications (like The Prairie Farmer and Farm Life) resisted low-interest federal lending, but 
endorsed other forms of federal legislative action.20  Business interests typically (but not 
universally) preferred the creation of privately funded cooperative lending institutions then 
popular in Europe—as did Theodore Roosevelt’s Country Life Commission.21   
 Congress sent a commission to the Continent, ostensibly to study the systems in place 
there and to identify ideas that might be copied here.22  The commission reported that rural 
“peoples banks” and credit associations prevalent in Germany, Austria, and Italy had 
successfully tailored financial programs for agriculture that could be adopted in the United 
States, if only small American banks were encouraged to pool their efforts in organizations that 
                                                                                                                                                             
now a business demanding large amounts of capital that could be obtained only by borrowing 
from investors encouraged by new legislation).   
18 Statement of Kingman N. Robins, in Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Convention of the 
Farm Mortgage Bankers Association of America, FARM MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N OF AM., 
Sept. 1917, at 14-19 [hereinafter 1917 FMBA Proceedings].    
19 Stuart W. Shulman, The Origin of the Federal Farm Loan Act: Agenda-Setting in the 
Progressive Era Print Press 244 (June, 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Oregon) (on file with Knight Library, University of Oregon).   
20 Id. at 239-244. 
21 Stuart W. Shulman, The Origin of the Federal Farm Loan Act, in FIGHTING FOR THE FARM: 
RURAL AMERICA TRANSFORMED 113, 116-117 (Jane Adams ed. 2003); REPORT OF THE 
COUNTRY LIFE COMMISSION, S. DOC. NO. 60-705, at 4-5 (1st Sess. 1909).    
22 See Robert B. Tootell, The Federal Land Banks, in GREAT AM. COOPERATORS 549, 551-552 
(Joseph G. Knapp et al. eds., 1967) (describing this and other European studies).   
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would operate under charter from the Federal Government.23  In the Smith case to come 
(launched just as the United States entered World War I), Bullitt seized upon the commission 
report as evidence that the 1916 Act amounted to a transplantation of the “German plan”—
“inimical to the spirit of our institutions.”24      
The Wilson Administration initially resisted anything tasting of subsidies for farmers and 
hoped to stimulate agriculture by other means.  Wilson himself favored educational 
demonstration and extension programs like those he had established in New Jersey.25  The 
Secretary of Agriculture, David Houston, advised the President that the use of Government funds 
to aid farmers would amount to illegitimate class legislation.26  Wilson, in turn, told Congress 
that farmers should be given no “privilege, such as extending to them the credit of the 
government itself”27 and went so far as to threaten a veto if Congress passed a loan program for 
farmers in 1914.28   
There was an argument that the general revisions in banking already achieved were 
sufficient to deal with any difficulties in rural credit.29 National banks had previously been 
barred from making real estate loans, but the Federal Reserve Act had eliminated that 
prohibition.30  Proponents of a special program for agriculture were unpersuaded.  National 
banks could make farm mortgage loans only for five years, nowhere near what many thought 
                                                 
23 REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION, PT. 3, S. DOC. NO. 63-380, at 9, 11, 31 (2d. Sess. 1914) 
[hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].    
 
24 Appellant’s Revised Brief at 7, Smith v. K.C. Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).  Bullitt 
acknowledged that the arrangements in the 1916 Act were not necessarily unlawful “merely 
because the system [was] German.”  Id. at 8.  But the connection had been made.  
25 Carl R. Woodward, Woodrow Wilson’s Agricultural Philosophy, 14 AGRIC. HIST. 129, 130-
134 (1940). 
26 1 DAVID F. HOUSTON, EIGHT YEARS WITH WILSON’S CABINET 84 (1926).    
27 Quoted in Myron T. Herrick, The Federal Farm Loan Act, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 
1917, at 222. 
28 ARTHUR S. LINK, THE HIGHER REALISM OF WOODROW WILSON 306 (1971). 
29 See Woodward, supra note 25, at 134 (contending that President Wilson had been thinking of 
rural credit when he championed the Federal Reserve Act). 
30 See Putnam, supra note 12, at 25-26. 
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farmers needed.31  Moreover, it was widely understood that national banks were disinclined to 
enter the farm mortgage business as a matter of policy.32   
The momentum for more forthright help for farmers thus continued to build.  The Wilson 
Administration incrementally changed its position, now embracing new credit legislation as part 
of its agenda for agriculture.33  Some historians today list the Farm Loan Act as an illustration of 
the Administration’s numerous means of improving agricultural production and the lives of 
farmers into the bargain.34   Wilson himself is said to have become “enthusiastic over its 
possibilities.”35   
W.G. McAdoo was the key to these events.  McAdoo had come to prominence as the 
visionary planner and manager of the great “tube” projects in New York City, which constructed 
the tunnels now used by PATH trains under the Hudson.36   In Washington, he was an 
extraordinarily able and energetic Secretary of the Treasury.  He shepherded the Federal Reserve 
Act through Congress and undertook bold measures to marshal the nation’s finances during 
World War I.37  In addition to his duties at Treasury, McAdoo was Director-General of the 
Railroad Administration during the war and, as this story reveals, he was the first chair of the 
Farm Loan Board.38   
By the spring of 1916, McAdoo was convinced that rural credit legislation was needed 
and appropriate: “[T]he rates of interest on farm mortgage loans were so exorbitant, and the 
money-lenders so grasping, that hundreds of farming communities lived in a state of perpetual 
fear and poverty.”39  Once committed to legislative action, McAdoo devoted his considerable 
                                                 
31 REPORT ON RURAL CREDITS, supra note 16, at 6. 
32 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 9-11, 30. 
33 HOUSTON, supra note 25, at 207.   
34 E.g., Marshall E. Dimock, Wilson the Domestic Reformer, in THE PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES 
OF WOODROW WILSON 228, 229 (Earl Latham ed. 1958). 
35 Woodward, supra note 25, at 134-135. 
36 ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, WILLIAM G. MCADOO AND THE HUDSON TUBES (1964). 
37 MARY SYNON, MCADOO 131-141 (1924).    
38 Id. at 202-203, 312.   
39 WILLIAM G. MCADOO, CROWDED YEARS: THE REMINISCENCES OF WILLIAM G. MCADOO 
436 (1931) [hereinafter CROWDED YEARS].   
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talents to the project.  He worked closely with congressional leaders to formulate the Act and 
described its adoption as one of the Administration’s “crowning achievements.”40  While he was 
Treasury Secretary, he supported the new federally chartered banks with public funds.  As the 
Farm Loan Board’s first chair, he promoted the federal banks in a variety of ways.  And then, 
after leaving the Government, he helped defend the banks and tax-exempt bonds in the Smith 
case.   
 In the alternative political universe that was Congress a hundred years ago, the legislative 
process ground out a meaningful program in a manner that has become so rare today.  Scores of 
bills were introduced and debated—most of them contemplating the creation of public financial 
institutions that would make farm loans at a favorable rate of interest.41  Constitutional 
objections were anticipated, and the floor manager in the Senate, Henry F. Hollis of New 
Hampshire, invited suggestions for addressing them.42  Knowledgeable members were aware 
that, in the great McCulloch case,43 John Marshall had described congressional power 
expansively, but had also sustained Congress’ authority to establish the Second National Bank in 
part on the far narrower theory that the Bank was a means of handling the Government’s own 
financial affairs.  In some minds, the validity of new federally chartered banks to serve 
agriculture could best be ensured by empowering them likewise to hold public money and help 
administer the Government’s finances.  Pressing this point, Senator Albert Cummins contended 
that the new banks would be upheld if they were given “some governmental purpose, however 
slight or insignificant.”44   
When the Sixty-Third Congress failed to agree on a bill, a joint committee was named to 
develop a compromise plan.  The joint committee’s proposal was introduced in the Sixty-Fourth 
Congress by Hollis in the Senate and Ralph W. Moss of Indiana in the House.45  The Senate 
embraced it virtually as written, but the House worked it over for some months before adopting 
                                                 
40 WIPRUD, supra note 16, at xiii (introduction by McAdoo); see M’Adoo to get $1 on New U.S. 
Job, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1919, § 6 at 21 (describing McAdoo as “one of the fathers” of the 
act).  
41 W. STULL HOLT, THE FEDERAL FARM LOAN BUREAU: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND 
ORGANIZATION 7-8 (1924).   
42 53 CONG. REC. 7026 (1916). 
43 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).   
44 53 CONG. REC. 7246 (1916). 
45 53 CONG. REC. 9859 (1916); 53 CONG. REC 7534 (1916); see Buckley, supra note 16, at 133-
136 (providing details not pertinent here).   
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revisions.46   A conference committee reconciled the Senate and House versions.47   Prominent 
members explained on the floor that they would have preferred a different bill but supported this 
one as an acceptable compromise.48  Both chambers adopted the conference report a few weeks 
ahead of the party conventions.49  There were only five negative votes in the Senate and only 
twelve in the House.50  President Wilson signed the new statute into law, perhaps with genuine 
enthusiasm, perhaps as a means of giving farmers a boost to balance legislation for the benefit of 
other economic sectors, and, then again by some accounts, perhaps as political expedience.51    
B. The Law in the Books 
The Farm Loan Act of 1916 deserved its reputation as “the Magna Charta of American 
farm finance.”52  There was something in it for everybody.      
 To satisfy farmers and business interests advocating cheap rural credit, Sections 3 and 4 
of the Act created the Federal Farm Loan Board within the Treasury Department and authorized 
it to charter Federal Land Banks—public cooperative institutions commissioned to make loans 
on agricultural land.   The President filled the seats on the Board, subject to Senate confirmation.   
The Secretary of the Treasury (initially McAdoo), served ex officio as chair.  The Farm Loan 
Board, in turn, appointed public members of the boards of Federal Land Banks to serve along 
with other members chosen by farmers’ associations—that is, potential borrowers themselves.    
                                                 
46 53 CONG. REC. 7712 (1916) (statement of Rep. Shouse); see WIPRUD supra note 16, at 4-5.  
 
47 H.R. REP. NO. 64-844 (1st Sess. 1916). 
48 See, e.g., 53 CONG. REC. app., at 1570 (1916) (statement of Rep. Norton) (explaining that the 
bill did not conform to his “own idea of the best system of rural-credit” but endorsing it 
nonetheless); 53 CONG. REC. app., at 1969-1971 (1916) (statement of Rep. Bailey) (declaring 
that the bill was not a “cure-all” but might “clear the way for more fundamental legislation”).  
49 Herrick, supra note 27, at 223.   
50 53 CONG. REC. 10114 (1916); THOMAS J. WALSH, FEDERAL FARM LOAN ACT, S. DOC. NO. 
64-524, at 22 (1st Sess. 1916); see also Putnam, supra note 12, at 42-46 (providing more details). 
 
51 Pub. L. No. 64-158, 1916 Stat. 3.  See Marshall E. Dimock, Woodrow Wilson as Legislative 
Leader, 19 J. POL. 3, 9 (1957) (offering the second thesis); LINK, supra note 28, at 306 
(advancing the third).   
52 BEN SUNBURY, THE FALL OF THE FARM CREDIT EMPIRE 4 (1990). 
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 Federal Land Banks were subject to important conditions.  They could not obligate 
themselves beyond twenty times their capital, they could not make loans to borrowers who were 
engaged in a business other than farming, they could not loan a single farmer more than $10,000, 
they could not fix the terms of mortgages at less than five or more than forty years, and they 
could not charge farmers an annual interest rate exceeding six per cent.  They also had enormous 
market advantages.  They drew the lion’s share of their initial capital from the Treasury 
Department, which committed about $9,000,000 in start-up funds.53  And they were able to raise 
additional money by issuing extraordinarily attractive bonds.  Pursuant to Section 26 of the Act, 
bonds sold to investors were instrumentalities of the United States and exempt from federal, 
state, and local taxes.   
 These tax exemptions enabled Federal Land Banks to raise money easily and to turn it 
into low-interest loans to farmers.  But the economics were complicated.   As a practical matter, 
mortgages on agricultural land were already free of most state and local taxes, because they were 
held by institutions that enjoyed their own tax exemptions.  The exemption from federal taxes 
was more significant and became much more so with the adoption of the federal income tax in 
1919.54   Wealthy individuals casting about for ways to reduce their income tax bills seized upon 
tax-exempt farm bonds (as well as Liberty Bonds and municipal bonds).55   
 To mollify private bankers, Section 16 of the Act authorized the Farm Loan Board also to 
charter Joint Stock Land Banks—privately organized financial institutions to share the field with 
Land Banks.  The idea, variously expressed, was that bankers already in the farm mortgage 
business could remain in the industry if they restructured, bringing their companies under the 
supervision of the Board and subjecting their lending practices to federal regulation.56  The 
                                                 
53 CROWDED YEARS, supra note 39, at 437-438 (explaining that Treasury “advanced practically 
all the capital at the beginning”); see Buckley, supra note 16, at 142 (explaining that the limits 
on Land Bank loans were meant to discourage speculators and to ensure that money flowed to 
actual farmers). 
54 E.D. Chassell, Federal Farm Loan Law, 11 THE LAWYER AND BANKER 258 (1918).   
 
55 Howard H. Preston, The Federal Farm Loan Case, 29 J. POL. ECON. 433, 435, 443-447 
(1921). 
56 George E. Putnam, The Federal Farm Loan System, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 51, 71-73 (1919); 
Victor W. Bennett, Joint Stock Banks in Retrospect, 20 J. FARM ECON. 857, 857-858 (1938); 
WIPRUD, supra note 16, at 103-104. Rep. Shouse explained on the floor that there were many 
“existing agencies through which money [was] being loaned to farmers” and that “the joint-stock 
land-bank feature of the bill” would “take care of those existing agencies” by making it possible 
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Treasury Department did not directly subsidize Joint Stock Banks by purchasing stock to set 
them in motion.   But Treasury did buy Joint Stock bonds and, in the main, Joint Stock Banks 
operated like Land Banks. They, too, made long-term loans to farmers at six per cent or less; 
they, too, raised funds by issuing tax-exempt bonds.  Private bankers successfully lobbied for 
provisions granting Joint Stock Banks two authorities denied to Land Banks.  Joint Stock Banks 
could extend credit not only to farmers but to businesses with less tangible links to agriculture, 
and they could loan individual borrowers more than $10,000.57  Those two capacities proved to 
be immensely important. 
 The provision for Joint Stock Banks was controversial.  Farm state members of Congress 
objected that the very idea of Joint Stock Banks established and operated for profit was 
antithetical to the Act’s public program.58  The addition of Joint Stock Banks essentially 
transformed the new structure from a single system of rural credit into a dual scheme in which 
Land Banks and Joint Stock Banks would compete for investors.  That competition would drive 
up the interest rates for bonds, which would inevitably drive up the rates farmers paid for 
mortgage loans, as well—the very interest rates it was the point of the Act to drive down.59  Yet 
the private banking interests pressing the Joint Stock option held the stronger political hand.  In 
the Smith litigation, Bullitt would marginalize Joint Stock Banks as “an evident after-thought.”60  
Hardly.  Acceptance of Joint Stock Banks as a concession to private bankers was the political 
price for an enacted law.61  Rank and file members understood this and acquiesced whether they 
liked it or not.  An amendment in the House that would have deleted the provision on Joint Stock 
Banks was defeated by an overwhelming majority.62 
 The Act also contained provisions that Cummins and others insisted upon for the sole 
purpose of fortifying both kinds of federally chartered banks against constitutional attack.  
                                                                                                                                                             
for them to continue their businesses “under Government supervision, with certain very distinct 
and very marked benefits.” 53 CONG. REC. 7713 (1916).   
57 Section 16, para. 8.     
 
58 53 CONG. REC. 7979 (1916) (statement of Rep. Oliver); id. at 7982 (statement of Rep. Finley).  
Accord Buckley, supra note 16, at 143. 
59 53 CONG. REC. 7992 (1916) (statement of Rep. Morgan).    
60 Appellant’s Revised Brief, supra note 24, at 15.   
61 Bennett, supra note 56, at 858; accord 53 CONG. REC. 10040, 10113 (1916) (statements of 
Reps. Quin and Lever). 
62 53 CONG. REC. 7995 (1916). 
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Section 6 authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to designate Land Banks and Joint Stock 
Banks as depositaries of federal money and to employ them as financial agents of the United 
States.  Other provisions empowered the new banks to buy and sell United States bonds63 and 
required Land Banks to hold Government bonds as at least five per cent of their capital.64  These 
elements were manifestly incidental to the primary purpose of the Act, which was to forge a new 
credit system for American agriculture.  Yet Congress promoted them as important additional 
objectives—to the point of listing them explicitly in the formal title to the Act: “An act to 
provide capital for agricultural development, to create standard forms of investment based upon 
farm mortgage, to equalize rates of interest upon farm loans, to furnish a market for United 
States bonds, to create government depositaries and financial agents for the United States, and 
for other purposes.”65 
 Contemporaneous reactions to the Farm Loan Act varied.  In hindsight, it is difficult to 
separate genuine assessments of the new federal framework from ideologically charged political 
objections.  At least some public statements may best be understood as so much posturing in 
hopes of influencing Congress to think and act again.  In his opening speech to the FMBA 
convention in 1918, the Association’s president, F.W. Thompson, condemned the Act as a 
transparent “bid for the farmer vote.”  By Thompson’s account, the Act was economically 
unsound in that it ignored market conditions that should properly determine the rate of return and 
attempted to “control by law a flat loaning rate of interest.”66  The purpose of the Act, he 
declared, was to “strike a body blow to organized farm mortgage bankers, expecting the latter to 
succumb and thus give the Federal Banks a practical monopoly on the farm mortgage 
business.”67   
C. The Law in Action 
 Actual experience under the Act was mixed.  The Farm Loan Board established twelve 
Land Banks, and they got off to a fair start early in 1917—effectively making loans from public 
funds and then finding private investors willing to buy tax-exempt bonds to keep the money 
                                                 
63 Section 13, para. 8.    
 
64 Section 5, para. 7.   
65 But see Buckley, supra note 16, at 144 (defending these provisions as mechanisms by which 
Treasury might assist federal banks having difficulty meeting their short-term obligations).  
66 1917 FMBA Proceedings, supra note 18, at 31.      
67 Id. at 31-32.   
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flowing.68  But private investments declined in the spring and summer.  The war in Europe was 
obviously a factor.  Impending American involvement was unsettling in itself.  In addition, tax-
exempt Liberty Bonds competed with farm bonds already on the market.69   
The situation spawned three undertakings meant to stimulate farm bond purchases. 
Congress authorized the Treasury Department to pump more public cash into Land Banks.70   
Secretary McAdoo made arrangements with four large houses to market the bonds.71  And, most 
important for our purposes, the four bond houses obtained a legal opinion assuring investors that 
the tax exemptions that made farm bonds attractive would be upheld as constitutional.   
 To make the case for the validity of the bonds convincingly, the bond agents went to an 
unimpeachable source: Charles Evans Hughes.  The former Governor of New York and 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was rock solid.72  He had served with most of the justices 
who would determine the validity of the Act, he was widely regarded as conservative where 
federal power was concerned, and he had just lost the presidential election to Wilson and thus 
had no reason to love any innovative program embraced by the Administration, however 
dubitante.73  For all this, Hughes told the bond houses precisely what they needed and wanted 
investors to hear.  In his considered opinion, the Land Banks and tax-free bonds authorized by 
the 1916 Act could rest on either of two congressional powers.74   
                                                 
68 1920 SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ANN. REP. 185-186 [hereinafter 1920 TREASURY 
REPORT]. 
69 Id. at 186. 
70 Id. at 187. 
71 FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL FARM LOAN BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 65-714, at 
17-18 (2d. Sess. 1918) (explaining the need to use the bond houses) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL 
REPORT]; Henry Hall, Liberty Bonds, Farm Loan Bonds and the General Market, 11 THE 
LAWYER AND BANKER 236, 240 (1918) (reporting the arrangements).    
72 See ROBERT F. WESSER, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES: POLITICS AND REFORM IN NEW YORK 
1905-1910 (1967) (describing Hughes’ career in New York); DEXTER PERKINS, CHARLES 
EVANS HUGHES AND AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC STATESMANSHIP (1956) (describing his tenure 
as an Associate Justice). 
73 Six sitting justices had been on the Court when Hughes was an Associate Justice—Holmes, 
Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Pitney, and White.  Brandeis had joined the Court just as 
Hughes was leaving.   
74 CHARLES E. HUGHES, FEDERAL LAND BANK BONDS (1917). 
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 First, Congress could tax (and thus spend) to provide for the general welfare—in this 
instance by stimulating agriculture to ensure an ample food supply.75  In turn, Congress could 
establish Federal Land Banks as a “necessary and proper” means of distributing public funds for 
the purpose.76  Hughes invoked Chief Justice Marshall’s capacious expressions of congressional 
power in McCulloch.  He acknowledged that private borrowers and investors might benefit.  But 
he insisted that the Government’s involvement in the Land Banks and the use of public funds to 
capitalize them over the near term sufficiently brought their existence and activities within the 
power to disburse public treasure for the common good.  Second, Congress could borrow money 
on the credit of the United States and, again, could create Land Banks as “necessary and proper” 
instruments for facilitating the Government’s fiscal operations.77  On this second point, Hughes 
cited the provisions that had been inserted in the Act to parry any constitutional challenge—
namely, the sections authorizing Treasury to designate Land Banks as depositaries of 
Government funds, empowering Land Banks to trade in United States securities, and requiring 
them to hold Government bonds. 78  Here, too, McCulloch provided all the precedential authority 
required. 
 If it was once established that Congress had power to create the Land Banks, Hughes 
maintained that the validity of tax exemptions for farm bonds issued by those institutions 
followed as a matter of course.  Congress was free to suspend federal taxes as an incident of its 
authority to impose taxes in the first place.  In one last effort to reassure private investors, 
Hughes offered that by authorizing farm bonds to be sold on the promise that they would not be 
taxable, Congress had committed the Government to private purchasers and could not renege.  
Anyone holding farm bonds could rest easy; anyone considering a future purchase could proceed 
with confidence. 
  The Administration’s efforts to shore up the Land Banks’ capital and Hughes’ (widely 
circulated) endorsement of their validity may have had some effect.  In early 1919 and into 1920, 
the Land Banks made loans to farmers on a massive scale.79  Yet the party was short-lived.  
When the Smith suit was initiated, the investment environment was unsettled yet again.  
Moreover, the Land Banks encountered competition from their more private-looking cousins, 
Joint Stock Banks authorized by the Act to operate in the same precincts. 
                                                 
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.   
78 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44, 63-65.   
791920 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 68, at 186.   
17 
 
 The Farm Loan Board moved more deliberately with respect to Joint Stock Banks, 
chartering only five in the early going.  There is evidence that the Board was not enamored of 
Joint Stock Banks and saw them for what their detractors in Congress had always claimed they 
were: unwarranted private competitors to Land Banks run by the Board’s appointees and farmers 
themselves.80  But the Board professed not to be “particularly concerned” whether Land Banks 
or Joint Stock Banks supplied farmers with needed loans.81  And in due course it acted on more 
applications filed by private bankers who resigned themselves to the new federal framework.  
James F. Toy told the FMBA that his finance company in Sioux City, Iowa had applied for a 
charter and urged his colleagues to do the same.  Toy insisted that, sooner or later, bankers would 
have to recognize that they had “the United States Government to compete with” and that (to 
coin a phrase) resistance was futile.  Their only chance was to accept the Joint Stock model and 
try to make it profitable.82  Before long, there were enough Joint Stock Banks to form their own 
organization.  The Secretary of the American Association of Joint Stock Land Banks defended 
bankers like Toy for seeing that “the day of the farm-mortgage broker, with his high rates and 
excessive commissions, was ended.”83 
For a while, private bankers who obtained Joint Stock charters were extremely 
successful.  When the complaint in Smith was filed in July of 1919, twenty-one Joint Stock 
Banks were up and running notwithstanding the war, concentrating their operations in the richest 
agricultural states.  The reasons for this success are debatable.  But it seems fair to say that Joint 
Stock Banks were able to capitalize on their advantages over Land Banks—that is, their ability to 
make larger loans to borrowers other than farmers.  By some accounts, those borrowers were 
“landlords and speculators.”84  Joint Stock Banks soon occupied nearly half the national market 
for agricultural mortgages and were proving to be the very menace their opponents had 
anticipated.85  Introduced as a politically necessary sop to protesting private bankers, they now 
                                                 
80 Bennett, supra note 56, at 864. 
81 FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 71, at 21-22 (contending that critics misconstrued the 
Board’s discouragement of fraudulent promotions by some private banks). 
82 1917 FMBA Proceedings, supra note 18, at 66.    
83 Exemption of Federal Farm Loan Bonds from Taxation: Hearings on S. 3109 Before the 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 66th Cong. 46 (1920) (statement of W.W. Powell). 
84 Preston, supra note 55, at 451. 
85 THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL FARM LOAN BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 66-553, at 3 
(2d Sess. 1920) (reporting that the Joint Stock Banks’ market share had increased from 15% to 
38% in the past year).   
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threatened to starve out both private bankers who refused to follow Toy’s lead and the 
centerpiece institutions created by the Act: publicly governed Federal Land Banks.86    
Even the comparative fortunes of Joint Stock Banks could not dispel opposition from 
other private bankers, who persisted in putting Joint Stock Banks in the same category with Land 
Banks.   A member of the Farm Loan Board, Charles E. Lobdell, reminded the FMBA that Joint 
Stock Banks had been added to the mix for the very purpose of allowing private banks a place in 
the new system.87  Yet many bankers wanted more—namely, the ability to maintain their 
existing businesses and to register as Joint Stock Banks, thus to operate as they always had 
(without much federal supervision), now with the tax advantages that federal law attached to 
Joint Stock status.88  There was some question whether the 1916 Act would permit private 
bankers to wear two hats, though some bankers managed to finesse the question by organizing 
Joint Stock Banks as affiliates.89   
  Meanwhile, the Farm Loan Board remained of two minds.  On the one hand, the Board 
continued to encourage private bankers to cooperate, even proposing amendments to the Act to 
make the Joint Stock model more acceptable.90  On the other, the Board declared that Land 
Banks alone could supply all the farm mortgage loans the country required, recommended that 
Land Banks, too, should be authorized to make large loans, and endorsed a bill by Senator Reed 
Smoot of Utah that would withdraw the authority of Joint Stock Banks to issue tax-exempt 
bonds.91  The Board’s apparent disdain for Joint Stock Banks, in turn, further discouraged private 
bankers.  Even if the other doubts and concerns about obtaining Joint Stock charters were 
                                                 
86 See George E. Putnam, Recent Developments in the Federal Farm Loan System, 11 AM. 
ECON. REV. 427, 432-443 (1921).   
87 1917 FMBA Proceedings, supra note 18, at 53.     
88 Id. at 62-65 (recording an inconclusive exchange between Lobdell and unidentified bankers).    
89 Bennett, supra note 56, at 859. 
90 Want Banks to Join Farm Loan System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1917, at 14 (reporting the 
Board’s endorsement of a reduction in the capital requirement for Joint Stock Banks).     
91 Exemption of Federal Farm Loan Bonds from Taxation, supra note 83, at 6; see 1920 
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overcome, bankers now feared that if they registered as Joint Stock Banks, they would be at the 
mercy of hostile regulators.92  
Through it all, the specter of the Supreme Court’s coming decision in the Smith case was 
a pervasive force.93  Bankers were (or claimed to be) unnerved by the choice with which they 
were presented.  If they accepted Joint Stock charters, they, too, would be required to make long-
term loans at artificially reduced rates.  Then, if it turned out that key features of the Act were 
unconstitutional (read the tax exemptions that made low rates feasible), they would be left 
holding the bag as the farm loan industry in its entirety collapsed around them.94   Opinion 
among private bankers thus converged on F.W. Thompson’s position that “the only alternative 
left … [was] to bring appropriate constitutional test suits as quickly as possible affecting both 
Federal Farm Loan Bank Bonds and the bonds of joint stock banks as well.”95     
By all accounts, the constitutional challenge in Smith wrecked the rural financial system 
established by the Act.  Sales of bonds dropped precipitously after the suit was filed.96  The Farm 
Loan Board directed that all applications for loans be taken subject to a favorable decision.97  
When loan commitments on that basis accumulated, Treasury itself purchased more bonds “to 
meet the emergency confronting the system.”98  Yet, in the end, the federal banks were forced to 
suspend operations entirely.  Whatever would have been the fate of federally chartered land 
banks and tax-exempt farm bonds apart from constitutional doubts, the persistence of uncertainty 
in the graphic form of an actual lawsuit put the entire program on hold for the year preceding the 
Court’s decision.99 
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II. The Test Case 
A. Initial Steps 
The FMBA decided against making litigation over the Farm Loan Act a formal part of its 
agenda.  James Toy warned that the public would view a legal challenge as “purely selfish”—an 
attempt to obstruct Congress’ effort to ensure that farmers could borrow money at a fair rate of 
interest.100  Others acknowledged that it would be bad business to antagonize both farmers and 
federal regulators at the same time.101  Some suggested that a “friendly” test suit could be 
brought, purporting to seek only clarification of the legal issues.102  The consensus was that 
members should support litigation individually, and member banks acting for themselves readily 
pledged subscriptions to pay the expenses of a test suit.103  In the event, funds raised from 
individual banks were channeled back through the FMBA, which issued a check directly.104   
 The FMBA’s incoming President orchestrated the effort.  J.E. “Daddy” Maxwell had 
been in the farm mortgage business all his adult life.  He had started with a partnership in the tiny 
village of Paola, Kansas and had built the Maxwell Investment Company into a regional 
powerhouse.105  Maxwell told the FMBA that bankers were not alone.  Other “large 
organizations” were aware of their plight and “promised support” for the “fight.”106  The 
identities of those “organizations” is not clear.  But it is a fair guess that Maxwell meant the 
country’s great insurance houses.   Robert L. Cox, President of the Association of Life Insurance 
Companies, addressed the FMBA in 1919.107  Cox was the life insurance industry’s chief 
                                                 
100 1917 FMBA Proceedings, supra note 18, at 100.    
101 Id. at 104-105. 
102 Id. at 204-205 (statement of W.M. Fitch). 
103 Id. at 149-152 (general discussion).    
104 The receipts of Bullitt’s law firm show a $6,500 payment from the FMBA on November 11, 
1920.  Letter from Shirley Harmon, Filson Historical Society, to author (undated) (on file with 
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106 Criticise Farm Loan Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1919, at 29. 
107 Farm Mortgage Bankers to Meet, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1919, at 31.  The content of Cox’ 
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spokesman in the period and took a special interest in agricultural finance.  At his own firm, 
Metropolitan Life in New York, Cox had charge of the Farm Loan Division.108 
Maxwell and other bankers in Kansas formed a committee to undertake litigation and 
enlisted the help of the FMBA secretary, H.M. Hanson, in obtaining counsel to do the work.  
Hanson initially approached John G. Johnson in Philadelphia, then perhaps the nation’s 
preeminent corporate litigator.  Johnson declined and later advised a banking journal that a 
constitutional attack on the Act would fail.109  Hanson then turned to Charles Evans Hughes—the 
very man destined to defend the constitutionality of what Congress had wrought.110  At this early 
stage, Hughes was willing to represent private banks.  But he declined to name a fee until the 
litigation was complete.  The conservative Kansas bankers balked at an open-ended arrangement.  
While they debated among themselves, the bond houses employed Hughes to give his personal 
legal opinion on the validity of the Act.  Soon thereafter, Hughes’ opinion appeared, anticipating 
and refuting the constitutional challenge.   
It was time for the bankers to look elsewhere.  Maxwell explained that they sought the 
recommendation of the “the largest investors in the country,”111 which, again, almost certainly 
meant life insurance companies.  Robert Cox sent a copy of Hughes’ opinion to William 
Marshall Bullitt in Louisville and asked for Bullitt’s “mind on the question.”112  Bullitt was 
known to insurance lawyers nationally because of his successful handling of cases in Kentucky.  
He had recently made an important speech to the Association of Life Insurance Counsel.  On this 
occasion, his response was evidently satisfying.  The bankers retained him, seconded by Frank 
Hagerman, a prominent railroad lawyer in Kansas City who had himself been an assistant in the 
                                                 
108 The general counsel at New York Life later complimented Bullitt on his brief in the Smith 
case and declared that he had no doubt that “[i]f the question had come up in Marshall’s day” the 
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Solicitor General’s office.113  Bullitt responded publicly to Hughes in a speech to the FMBA the 
following year, the text of which was also published and circulated.114  
A precise account of the suit’s development cannot be recovered.115  But an 
approximation of the story can be inferred from the bits and pieces of documentary evidence that 
can be found.  Fortunately, Bullitt was an inveterate note-taker.  His  diary strongly suggests that 
Cox directed the bankers to Bullitt and that Maxwell steered Bullitt to the Kansas City Title & 
Trust Company and Charles Smith.116   
 We know something about Charles E. Smith and the Trust Company.  In the last years of 
the Nineteenth Century and the early part of the Twentieth, the mortgage lending industry 
labored to develop a fast, cheap, and reliable system for verifying land titles.  The most 
promising possibility was title insurance, which protected investors against mistakes in title 
searches.  The point of insurance was pooling risks, and as small abstract companies became 
insurers they naturally tended to merge.  In 1915, the Kansas City Title & Trust Company was 
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formed from a half dozen smaller firms.117  John Henry Smith had been vice president of one of 
the firms, Union Abstract & Guaranty Company.  He became secretary of the new company, 
and, in 1919, he was named president.  His brother, Charles, became a vice president.118   
From the outset, the Trust Company was noted for rapid growth, fueled by innovation.  
The company was the first of its kind to extend operations to other states, the first to frame a 
standard policy limiting liability for title forgeries, and the first to construct facilities adequate 
for storing title documents that might be needed to answer claims.  Most important for our 
purposes, the Trust Company pioneered the business of supplying title insurance to banks 
making loans to farmers throughout the Midwest and the South.119  
 A title insurance company made money by providing insurance that would foster farm 
loans—not, presumably, by purchasing bonds issued to raise capital for extending loans.  But the 
Trust Company was also chartered to engage in “the business of acting … as agent, executor, 
administrator, guardian, curator, trustee and generally in fiduciary capacities.”120   Both Smiths 
were well known in Kansas City financial circles.  In addition to his position at the Trust 
Company, John Henry was president of McCrae Securities and a director of the Security 
National Bank.121  It is possible that the Trust Company itself made agricultural loans.  But there 
is no surviving evidence that the company was among the mortgage banks that retained Bullitt.  
Its name did not appear on the list of the FMBA’s members in 1917.  It is more likely that the 
Trust Company became involved because of its longstanding interest in and association with 
banks that did lend money to farmers.122   
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The shareholder action in Smith was a friendly matter.  Charles Smith was not a 
disgruntled shareholder.  He was a vice president of the Trust Company.   Some observers 
apparently believed that Charles acted alone in bringing the action.  One newspaper asked 
whether “one individual” should be permitted to initiate a lawsuit that could “injure millions” of 
farmers.123   More knowledgeable critics smelled a rat.  After the Supreme Court decision, one 
journal claimed that there had always been “a serious question of the bona fides of the plaintiff 
Smith who represented in fact the Farm Mortgage Bankers Association.”124  The case had 
proceeded, it was said, on the basis of a “state of facts” prepared to disguise “the dirt on the 
hands of the plaintiff seeking equity.”125  There really is no question about Charles.  He was a 
shill for the mortgage banks sponsoring the suit.     
The Trust Company’s attorney, Justin DeWitt Bowersock, was a prominent local political 
figure and himself a member of the Trust Company’s board.  There is no evidence that he 
deliberately defaulted in his job.  But he candidly acknowledged that he deferred to Hughes, 
Wickersham, and McAdoo to marshal the defense.  According to Bowersock, the Trust 
Company’s role was “secondary” to the “paramount” interests of the intervenors and the 
Government itself.  The “titular defendant” actually appeared “rather as a casus belli than as a 
chief belligerent.”126  Then again, no one who participated in Smith made any effort to frustrate 
the suit on procedural or jurisdictional grounds.  Everyone acknowledged the convenient 
litigation tool a shareholder action supplied for getting to the merits.   
B. The Form of the Action 
Bullitt’s first order of business was to construct a civil action with the best chance of 
achieving an adjudication of the constitutional questions he wanted to raise.  He might have 
generated some rudimentary dispute between one of his client banks and a Federal Land Bank or 
Joint Stock Bank—for example, a disagreement over a particular mortgage foreclosure.   But a 
suit of that kind might not have implicated the federally chartered bank’s constitutionality or, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commerce Trust Company, respectively, which were members of the FMBA.  KANSAS CITY 
TITLE & TRUST COMPANY, COMPANY OFFICERS (1921) (Missouri Valley Special Collections, 
Kansas City Public Library). 
 
123 W.J. Bryan, Time for Remedy, 21 THE COMMONER NO. 3, at 2 (1921).   
124 Land Banks Win, 14 THE LAWYER AND BANKER 69 (Charles E. George ed. 1921).    
125 Id.   
126 Brief of Appellee, Kansas City Title and Trust Co. at 2, Smith v. K.C. Title & Trust Co., 255 
U.S. 180 (1921).   
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what was most important, the validity of the tax exemptions for farm loan bonds. The 
constitutionality of the Second National Bank had been presented in McCulloch, but there, as in 
the Osborn case,127 the Bank was the moving party and its ability to engage in litigation logically 
entailed its lawful existence.128   
Bullitt might have persuaded state or local tax officials to sue a bond holder who claimed 
an exemption under the Act.  But a public action would have required tacit agreement, and there 
was a risk of losing control.  Moreover, farm bonds were primarily appealing to investors 
because of the exemption from federal income taxes.  It is unlikely that the Treasury Department 
would have cooperated in a suit challenging the constitutionality of tax rules written by 
Congress.  Recall that Secretary McAdoo had a hand in drafting the Act and thereafter promoted 
federally chartered banks with great energy.129   
 In the event, Bullitt framed the suit as a shareholder action by Charles Smith against his 
own corporation.  In part, the shareholder device may have been meant to mask the interests 
actually behind the attack on the Farm Loan Act.  Yet there are also substantive explanations.  
The shareholder suit in Smith was an ingenious means of marshaling all the constitutional 
questions touching the Act for challenge in a single stroke and, into the bargain, litigating that 
challenge in federal court.  Bullitt almost certainly chose the shareholder model for these 
reasons, albeit there is no surviving documentary evidence of what he actually thought and did.   
It turns out, though, that he scarcely had to develop the idea on his own.  Corporations 
had been using shareholder suits in this way for decades.  There is a story behind the form of the 
                                                 
127 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
128 In Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824), the Court had only 
assumed that some federal question regarding the Bank’s status could potentially be placed in 
issue—not that it was.  Then again, the defendant corporation in Planters’ Bank raised an 
unsuccessful constitutional defense. 
129 A bond holder could scarcely sue tax collectors to establish that farm bonds could not be 
exempted from taxation—even if there had been a procedural mechanism for taking the initiative 
more than thirty years before the Declaratory Judgment Act.  Nor was there any viable argument 
that a bond holder could go against the Farm Loan Board or the federally chartered banks, 
contending that the holder would suffer financial losses if the bonds turned out to be taxable after 
all.  As explained below, factual harm alone was insufficient for standing at the time.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 134-137.  Bullitt would have been hard pressed to show that federal 




action in Smith, but it is not confined to Smith alone.  It extends to a pattern of shareholder suits 
employed to generate federal jurisdiction for corporate litigation attacking social welfare 
legislation.   Corporations (including banks, especially banks) did this all the time.  The Supreme 
Court knew they were doing it and expressed misgivings.  But on the whole the Court 
acquiesced.130 
 Corporations’ use of shareholder suits to advance constitutional claims overlaps with 
another narrative: corporations’ exploitation of diversity jurisdiction to obtain the benefits of the 
general common law applied in the federal courts prior to the Erie decision in 1938.131  The 
Supreme Court indulged corporate litigation in diversity on a variety of fronts.  Eventually, 
however, the Court discarded the very idea of general law and held that federal courts sitting in 
diversity would ordinarily apply the decisional law of the state concerned—however unfavorable 
that law might be to corporate interests.132  By contrast, the Court was never persuaded that 
federal jurisdiction was unwarranted to address constitutional claims. 
The Smith case demonstrates that a shareholder action could open the door to the federal 
courts for the adjudication of a corporate attack on a federal program.  The shareholder model 
was a means of satisfying three prerequisites for invoking the power of the federal judiciary: 
standing to appear in an Article III court, the federal court’s equitable jurisdiction to extend 
injunctive relief, and the court’s statutory subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the action.  As 
things turned out, Bullitt probably worked harder than necessary to frame precisely the right 
shareholder suit for these purposes, given that everyone involved wanted the litigation to go 
forward.  Still, a full understanding of what happened demands attention to the world as Bullitt 
saw it in 1919 and the strategy he devised to obtain the benefits of the shareholder device for his 
real clients—the mortgage banks paying his fee.      
1. Standing 
Today, a private mortgage bank would probably be able to mount a constitutional 
challenge to a statute like the Farm Loan Act.  The plaintiff bank could complain that federally 
chartered banks issuing tax-exempt bonds cut into the private bank’s profits.  That competitive 
                                                 
130 See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 1-8 
to 1-14 (2010); EVAN TSEN LEE, JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA 70 (2010). 
131 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
132 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY 
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AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF 
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injury would satisfy the basic constitutional requirement for standing.   Moreover, today, the 
statute itself would probably defuse nonconstitutional standing barriers by expressly authorizing 
private suits by designated plaintiffs against either the federal agency administering the program 
or an entity (public or private) actually conducting the activities said to harm the complaining 
parties.  Then, too, the Administrative Procedure Act now authorizes judicial review at the 
behest of a plaintiff who is “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action”—a category of 
factual interests that includes the interest in avoiding competition.133   
But when the Smith case was initiated, the requirements for standing were quite different.  
A party seeking access to an Article III court had to assert injury to a legal interest, which was 
understood to mean a violation of a legal right.  Injury from competition, however real, was 
inadequate.134  The leading decision on the point, Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,135 involved a 
private utility company complaining of competition from public power plants.136  It would be 
another year beyond Alabama Power, and twenty beyond Smith, before the Supreme Court 
would be satisfied with factual injury alone.137   
It is debatable whether the “legal interest” test for standing in Alabama Power was 
grounded in Article III and the separation of powers, as opposed to judicial discretion or perhaps 
a combination of constitutional and prudential considerations.  The modern Court has voiced the 
former view.138  Yet even if the “legal interest” limitation was nonconstitutional and thus 
something Congress could relax, there was no provision in the 1916 Act permitting competing 
banks to sue the Farm Loan Board or the federally chartered banks.  Nor was there any free-
standing means of seeking judicial review of the Act itself or actions taken under its aegis.  The 
                                                 
133 Ass’n of  Data Processing Svc. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). 
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135 302 U.S. 464 (1938). 
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Administrative Procedure Act was a half-century away.139   
The 1916 Act did contain a boilerplate “sue and be sued” provision.140  But nothing 
suggests that anyone thought that clause authorized suits by private banks.  The “sue and be 
sued” clause merely established Federal Land Banks as juridical entities capable of participating 
in litigation as though they were natural persons.141  The only other provision in the Act arguably 
bearing on litigation was the severance clause, which stated that a judgment by “any court of 
competent jurisdiction” holding some part of the Act invalid would have no effect on the 
remaining provisions.142  The premise of that clause was that someone could challenge the Act’s 
validity in court by some means.   But obviously the severance clause did not itself authorize 
litigation.   
Bullitt’s difficulty regarding standing, accordingly, was that his real clients, private 
mortgage banks, had no legal rights to assert against the parties whose behavior was diminishing 
their profits: the Farm Loan Board and the Land Banks and Joint Stock Banks.  Bullitt certainly 
meant to contend that the Board and the federally chartered banks were acting without lawful 
authority.  And he in particular meant to argue that the tax exemptions for the bonds they issued 
were invalid.   But there was no intelligible argument that the actions of federal officers and 
operators constituted a breach of any legal duty owed in particular to private bankers.   
This is where the shareholder suit model came into play.  The directors of a corporation 
owed a legal duty of care to the company they served and its shareholders.  That duty, in turn, 
could be enforced in the courts via a shareholder derivative action against the directors and, in 
some instances, against third parties whose dealings with the company were allegedly unlawful.  
Charles Smith may seem to us to have been an unlikely candidate to mount a constitutional 
challenge to the 1916 Act and the tax-free bonds it authorized.  But he was precisely the plaintiff 
Bullitt needed to achieve standing before an Article III court.   
                                                 
139 It is unlikely Bullitt could have managed a constitutional challenge to the Act by means of an 
equitable suit against the Farm Loan Board, relying on a pre-APA nonstatutory form of 
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Shareholder actions were not always a sure thing.  Indeed, the Supreme Court initially 
hesitated to permit them, especially when shareholder complaints spilled out of the company 
itself to reach other corporations or governmental regulators.  The Court became more receptive 
as time went on.  But the early precedents revealed a paradox.  If shareholders and directors were 
actually in agreement and a shareholder suit was instituted only for litigation purposes, the Court 
usually went along.  Illustrations include cases in which out-of-state shareholders lent their 
names to lawsuits to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction.143  If, however, shareholders were 
genuinely antagonistic to directors, the Court was reluctant to let them interfere with the 
directors’ rightful control of company activities.144   
In part, the Court reasoned that other companies transacted business with a corporation as 
an entity, without entering any relationship with individual shareholders, and that those other 
companies reasonably expected that, if a deal excited litigation, a suit would be advanced by the 
corporation with which they were in privity.   More important for present purposes, the Court 
also worried that shareholder suits would undermine internal corporate governance and directors’ 
ability to decide where a company’s interests lay.  In Hawes v. Oakland,145 accordingly, the 
Court held that, in the case of a suit “founded on a right of action existing in the corporation 
itself, and in which the corporation itself [was] the appropriate plaintiff,” a shareholder had 
standing to sue only if the directors’ behavior was fraudulent or “beyond the authority conferred 
on them by their charter.”146   
 
                                                 
143 See infra text accompanying notes 173-176.    
144 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 662 (1986). A derivative suit depended 
both on a breach of trust by the directors and on the company’s status as an independent entity. 
In the absence of the former, a shareholder would have had no cognizable complaint about the 
directors’ administration of the company’s interests; in the absence of the latter, the shareholder 
would have had no corporate rights to champion against the third party. Bert S. Prunty Jr., The 
Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 990-991, 994 
(1957). 
145 104 U.S. 450 (1881).   
146 Id. at 460.  But see Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally 
Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 107-108 (1997) (explaining that federal courts 
sometimes allowed derivative suits when state courts would have declined). 
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The most recent precedent in point was the United Copper case,147 decided the year 
Bullitt started work.  Justice Brandeis had written a cryptic opinion for the Court summarily 
rejecting an attempt by shareholders to sue other companies on United Copper’s behalf.  
Brandeis explained that the action should have been dismissed, because the shareholders had not 
alleged that the defendant-companies’ wrongful acts had caused injury to them as individuals, 
but only that the defendants’ violations of federal law had damaged the corporation and that the 
directors’ had failed to file a suit for compensation.   In the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, such as ultra vires conduct by the board, it was for the directors to decide whether 
to engage in litigation, not shareholders pressing a different agenda. 
Bullitt must have seen Brandeis in particular as a threat.  True, the issue in United Copper 
(as well as Hawes) had been whether shareholders could bring an action that was derivative in 
the sense that they purported to advance the company’s rights against third parties—something 
Bullitt had no intention (or ability) to do.  Yet Brandeis had plainly signaled doubts about actions 
that were derivative in the baseline sense that shareholders purported to protect the company’s 
rights against the directors.  If Brandeis took the same attitude toward derivative suits in either 
flavor, Charles Smith might not have standing after all.  
This risk explains the way Bullitt drafted the complaint in the Smith case—namely, to 
satisfy the concerns about derivative suits expressed in the Court’s cases.  He formally named the 
Trust Company itself as the sole defendant and explicitly asserted that the suit was “not founded 
on rights which [would] properly be asserted by the defendant Trust Company” against others.148   
He thus expressly disclaimed any effort to represent the company against outsiders (like federal 
officials and bank managers).  He alleged that the proposed purchase of the bonds was not 
authorized by the statutes governing the company’s incorporation.  And he alleged the very thing 
Brandeis had found missing from the complaint in United Copper—namely, that the shareholder 
himself would be “damaged in a large sum” if the planned bond purchases were not enjoined.149   
William Marshall Bullitt was nobody’s fool.  He would have understood that this 
complaint initiated a shareholder suit that would likely arouse objections from Justice Brandeis.  
It was derivative in the sense that the shareholder-plaintiff  hoped to enforce the company’s legal 
interests against the directors.  Functionally, a suit against the company to keep it from 
                                                 
147 United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917). 
148 Bill in Equity, supra note 120, at 10 (emphasis added).      
149 Id. at 12 (emphasis added).  Cf. Thompson v. NAS, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 863, 869 
(2011) (indicating that insofar as Article III is concerned a stockholder today can sue a company 
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purchasing bonds was also, necessarily, a suit against the directors to override their decision to 
do so.  And a challenge to the directors’ action was necessarily an attempt to spare the company, 
as well as shareholders, the injury that the purchase of invalid bonds would entail.  The 
complaint explicitly alleged that the Trust Company, too, stood to suffer losses.150  Yet Bullitt 
undoubtedly hoped that by excluding federal officers and managers from the picture, he 
minimized the chance that Brandeis would balk, perhaps taking the full Court with him.   
Consequences followed from this structure of the action in Smith.  One, of course, was 
that the bill Bullitt filed articulated no claim for relief on the strength of a violation of federal law 
alone.  The Trust Company could not be said to violate federal law simply by purchasing bonds.  
The only parties that might have been accused of acting unconstitutionally, the Farm Loan Board 
and the federally chartered banks, were not defendants.  This seems anomalous, but there was no 
practical import.  The beauty of the shareholder suit in Smith was that it supplied an effective 
vehicle for raising constitutional complaints about the conduct of federal officials and managers 
without making them defendants.   If Bullitt thought it was important that the Federal Land 
Banks and Joint Stock Banks should be involved to make the test case serious, he could count on 
them to intervene.  And they did.    
The only claim the bill did advance was an alleged violation of state law—specifically 
that Missouri state statutes prohibited the Trust Company’s purchase of tax-exempt farm bonds 
issued by federally chartered banks, albeit because both were allegedly unauthorized by the 
Federal Constitution.  The bill asserted that provisions under which the Trust Company was 
organized provided that corporations could “buy, invest in and sell all kinds of government, 
state, municipal and other bonds and all kinds of negotiable and non-negotiable paper, stocks or 
other investment securities.”151  Bullitt contended that the clear implication was that the company 
was authorized to make only “real legal ‘investments,’ as distinguished from those which [were] 
                                                 
150 Bill in Equity, supra note 120, at 12.  It would be dangerous to suggest that Bullitt meant to 
avoid the derivative model entirely by framing the suit as a “direct” shareholder action.  The 
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today.  See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Del. 2004) 
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concerns about derivative actions, especially from Justice Brandeis. 
151 Bill in Equity, supra note 120, at 7. 
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unauthorized and pretended.”152  That argument was contestable.  But here, too, there were no 
practical implications.   All the defendants expressly conceded that Bullitt interpreted the 
Missouri statutes correctly and that, if the bonds lacked federal constitutional foundation, the 
company’s purchase of them would violate its charter as a matter of state law.153   
Finally, the state-law basis of the action in Smith invited Justice Holmes’ objection that 
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  There was some irony in this.  It is entirely 
possible that the masterful lawyer representing the plaintiff in Smith carefully and skillfully 
named the Trust Company as the defendant and alleged only a violation of state law as a hedge 
against the position on shareholder suits he anticipated from Justice Brandeis, only to find that 
Brandeis would not sit on the Smith case.  Then, by grounding the complaint in state law to 
satisfy Brandeis, he ran headlong into Holmes’ position on federal-question jurisdiction.  But 
that did not matter either, because a strong majority of the justices rejected Holmes’ view of the 
jurisdictional issue. 
A shareholder suit was crucial for purposes of standing to challenge the Farm Loan Act, 
given that Bullitt’s actual clients, competing private banks, lacked the necessary legal interest. 
Still, it is possible that Bullitt’s painstaking efforts to frame a shareholder action that would 
negotiate precedents like Hawes and United Copper were unnecessary in the end.  The 
defendants raised no objections, and the district court ignored the procedural posture of the case.  
In the Supreme Court, Brandeis recused himself and the rest of the justices expressed no 
reservations about the shareholder nature of the suit.  Justice Day’s opinion made nothing of the 
specifics in the bill, saying only that the “general allegations as to the interest of the shareholder” 
were sufficient.154     
2. Equity Jurisdiction 
The Smith case was initiated before the merger of law and equity.  Looking back now, it 
is difficult always to isolate discussions of equity jurisdiction in a district court from discussions 
of standing. The Supreme Court described the question in Hawes, for example, as whether the 
plaintiff in that case had “standing in a court of equity.”155  Yet since Bullitt’s purpose was to 
                                                 
152 Appellant’s Revised Brief, supra note 24, at 3.   
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154 255 U.S. at 246. 
155 Hawes, 104 U.S. at 462.   
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secure a federal injunction, he necessarily had to satisfy the familiar prerequisites for proceeding 
on the equity side of the district court.   
Here, too, a shareholder suit supplied an answer.  A shareholder action was itself a 
creature of equity, originally developed by Chancery to fill the gap when the law courts refused 
to settle intracorporate disputes.156  When Bullitt took up his task in Smith, he had the benefit of 
earlier cases in which shareholder suits had proven their value to corporations pursuing equitable 
relief.   
The great income tax cases, Pollock 157 and  Brushaber,158  are illustrations.  The 
corporations in those cases could not themselves sue federal tax collectors for judicial protection 
up front, but had to pay objectionable taxes and ask for a refund later.  In classic language, a 
corporation had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a suit for reimbursement.  Applicable 
statutes adopted the same policy.  Specifically, § 3224 of the Revised Judicial Code barred a 
federal court from entertaining a suit “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection 
of any tax.”159  In Pollock and Brushaber, however, the Court held that a shareholder suit to keep 
a corporation from paying taxes was not the same as a suit by the corporation resisting payment.  
So a shareholder could invoke a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction to enjoin the payment of 
taxes by the corporation, § 3224 notwithstanding.   
In Smith, Bullitt had no need to get around the special limits on equity jurisdiction 
captured in § 3224.  He was making no attempt to enjoin the collection of taxes, only to prevent 
the Trust Company from trying to take advantage of tax exemptions.  He had only to satisfy the 
familiar requirements for a shareholder action to protect the company from the board of 
directors.  The elements of such a suit comprised a context-specific facsimile of the traditional 
conditions for equity jurisdiction—conditions ensuring that the plaintiff acted in good faith and 
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159 REV. STAT. § 5947, 3 U.S. COMP. STAT. 1913, p. 2638.  Neither the equitable rule nor its 
statutory analogue withheld judicial power.  See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 
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faced irreparable harm that only an injunction could forestall.  In a derivative action, the 
shareholder had to allege not only that the directors were acting or threatening to act ultra vires, 
but also that the shareholder had “exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain, within the 
corporation itself, the redress of his grievances.”160   Bullitt had no difficulty with this, 
explaining in the complaint that Charles Smith had objected to the purchase of the bonds, that the 
board had held a meeting on the question, and that the directors had adopted a formal resolution 
declaring their position that the bonds were valid and their intention to go ahead with the deal.161   
In this instance, too, Bullitt’s careful lawyering was probably unnecessary.  The defense 
objected that the allegations in the bill failed to state a “cause of action in equity.”162  But we will 
see in a moment that the idea was to join issue on the constitutional questions.163  The district 
court dismissed the bill “for want of equity.”164  But there, too, the clear meaning was that the 
plaintiff’s constitutional claims were rejected on the merits.165  In the Supreme Court, Justice 
Day cited the directors’ declaration that they meant to purchase farm bonds and referred to Smith 
as an “objecting shareholder.”166   But he dealt with the district court’s jurisdiction in equity only 
by announcing the conclusion that the allegations in the bill “[gave] jurisdiction” under Pollock 
and Brushaber.167   
3. Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter 
The third threshold question in Smith was the one that ultimately divided the Supreme 
Court—namely, the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.168  Today, a competing company 
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with standing to sue typically can establish federal-question jurisdiction for a constitutional 
attack on a statute like the Farm Loan Act.  The statute itself might contain a provision 
conferring federal jurisdiction in specified cases likely to arise.  In the absence of a special 
jurisdictional grant, the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, almost 
always answers.169   But, here again, the options open to Bullitt were more limited.     
There was no jurisdiction-conferring provision in the 1916 Act.170  Nor was the “sue and 
be sued” clause up to the task.  In the Osborn case,171  John Marshall had construed a similar 
clause to confer jurisdiction on federal courts in cases affecting the Second National Bank.  
Marshall rationalized Osborn’s jurisdictional holding on the ground that the “sue and be sued” 
clause in that case explicitly referred to suits in federal court.172   The clause in the Farm Loan 
Act was more general, referring to “any court of law or equity.”   
A shareholder suit once more provided Bullitt with what he needed.   Corporate lawyers 
before him had used shareholder derivative actions to manufacture diversity jurisdiction for 
litigating federal constitutional claims.  If a corporation had a dispute with another local party 
and wanted to sue in federal court, the corporation declined itself to take legal action but still 
managed the trick by recruiting an out-of-state stockholder as a surrogate.  In Dodge v. 
Woolsey,173 for example, a citizen of Connecticut who owned stock in a Cleveland bank 
(Woolsey) contended that the bank directors were set to comply with an effort by an Ohio tax 
collector (Dodge) to enforce an Ohio law subjecting the bank to a tax, the imposition of which 
would violate the Contract Clause.  Woolsey had written to the directors to demand that they 
                                                                                                                                                             
v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 528 (1926) (acknowledging the way professionals talked about equity 
but explaining that a federal court’s power to adjudicate was not implicated). 
169 See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Svc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 740, 749 (2012) (recognizing a 
presumption in favor of § 1331 jurisdiction).   
170 There is a little legislative history indicating that federal jurisdiction was assumed. 
Representative Cullop offered a floor amendment that would have acknowledged state court 
jurisdiction “in all proceedings instituted under the provisions of this act.” Cullop contended that, 
in the absence of an explicit provision on state court authority, federal officials (presumably he 
meant officials of federally chartered banks) would always bring foreclosure actions in federal 
court. His amendment was defeated without serious debate.  53 CONG. REC. 8004-8005 (1916).   
 
171 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
172 See Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 253-254 (1992). 
173 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). 
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resist the tax.  They had responded that, while they agreed that the tax was unconstitutional, they 
would not file their own action due to undisclosed “obstacles in the way of testing the law in the 
courts of the State.”174  Dodge objected that the suit was collusive.  Yet he offered no proof, and 
the Supreme Court confirmed the circuit court’s jurisdiction.   
The justices were awake to the potential of shareholder suits to create federal diversity 
jurisdiction routinely.   In Hawes v. Oakland, the Court recognized that the number of 
shareholder diversity actions had increased significantly after Dodge.175  Yet if the claims 
advanced were federal, the Court was content that diversity jurisdiction could be invoked to get 
them into federal court.176  If the justices had it in mind to put a stop to the practice, they changed 
their minds when Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1875, which contained the forerunner to 
§ 24—conferring original trial-level federal jurisdiction in suits “arising under” federal law.177  
That change eliminated the incentive to invoke diversity jurisdiction at all in cases that could be 
heard under the new provision for federal-question jurisdiction.  In Hawes, the Court said that a 
suit like the one in Dodge would “undoubtedly” now come within a district court’s jurisdiction 
by virtue of the federal constitutional claim alone.178  
With cases like Dodge and Hawes on the books, Bullitt had a choice.  He could concoct 
diversity jurisdiction easily enough, so long as he was careful about it and deflected a provable 
charge of collusion.  It is hard to think he could not identify an out-of-state shareholder to 
substitute for Charles Smith.  If all the stock in the Trust Company was held locally, he might 
have shifted to a different corporation.  The Trust Company was scarcely the only firm around.  
Any corporation anywhere in the country would serve as well (for these purposes) if it invested 
in farm loan bonds.   Moreover, by invoking diversity Bullitt could avoid the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, which restricted jurisdiction under § 24 to cases in which a federal question 
appeared in a properly pleaded complaint.179 
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175 Hawes, 104 U.S. at 452.  See supra text accompanying note 145.   The income tax cases, 
Pollock and Brushaber, were also diversity actions.     
176 Woolhandler, supra note 146, at 92-98 (contending that the Court approved of diversity 
actions generating jurisdiction for constitutional arguments).   
177 Act of  March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. 
178 104 U.S. at 459.    
179 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
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Then again, Bullitt could also invoke federal-question jurisdiction.  There was no real 
doubt that his bill in equity would refer to a federal issue.  To plead that the company was about 
to violate state law, the bill would have to allege that there was something unlawful about 
purchasing the bonds.  And to allege that, the bill would properly identify the constitutional 
flaws Bullitt saw in them.   Of course, the Court had already indicated in Hawes that federal-
question jurisdiction was available where the issues to be decided were constitutional.  In the 
event, Bullitt invoked district court jurisdiction exclusively under § 24.  Since the case 
implicated the validity of a federal statute, it arose “under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”180   
Not only did a shareholder suit generate subject matter jurisdiction.  It provided an 
opportunity to collect in one action any and all constitutional complaints about the Farm Loan 
Act.  Every constitutional charge that could plausibly be advanced was presented inasmuch as all 
the arguments went to the validity of the bonds the Trust Company was about to buy, thus to the 
dispute between the shareholder and the directors over the lawfulness of the proposed purchase.  
Nothing could have been neater.    
No one on the defense side objected to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and 
the district court raised no doubts of its own.  The Supreme Court’s treatment of the question is 
examined below in Part III.  Suffice it to say here that, for good reason, the parties plainly 
perceived no difficulty with federal-question jurisdiction when the gravamen of the dispute was 
the constitutionality of a federal statute.  The full Court, through Justice Day, acknowledged the 
issue but was easily convinced for the same reason.  Justice Holmes was not, of course, and we 
will come to his thinking in Part III.   
* * * * * 
  Bullitt was hired by private mortgage lenders vexed by competition from federally 
chartered banks that could raise capital cheaply by issuing tax-exempt bonds.  As he sized up the 
situation, he decided that the hurdles in the way of a successful constitutional challenge to the 
1916 Act and the tax exemptions for farm bonds could best be cleared by pressing a 
shareholder’s allegation that his own company was threatening to make unlawful bond 
purchases.  For standing, Bullitt could rest on the shareholder’s ability to charge that the 
directors’ acquisition of bonds would violate their legal obligations to the company and its 
shareholders.  For jurisdiction in equity, he could plead the traditional conditions for a 
shareholder derivative action.  For subject matter jurisdiction, he could rely on the federal-
question jurisdictional statute as it had already been interpreted (at least in dictum).  Small 
wonder Bullitt filed the shareholder suit he did.  Given what he knew or reasonably anticipated, 
he could scarcely have done anything else.   
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C. The District Court 
 Counsel to the Trust Company, Justin Bowersock, made but one contribution in the trial 
court—a motion to dismiss “for the reason that the bill of complaint, as amended, [did] not state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in equity.”181  At a glance, one might understand 
that Bowersock at least meant to contest jurisdiction on the equity side of the court.  But he 
charged no collusion and acquiesced in the allegations setting up the shareholder action—that is, 
the assertion that Smith had asked the directors to desist and been refused.  So it appears that he 
meant only to say that the allegations in the complaint, if proven to be true, would not establish 
that the Act and the tax exemptions were unconstitutional such that an injunction should issue.  
In the Supreme Court, Justice Day described Bowersock’s motion as effectively a demurrer, 
although that pleading instrument had been abolished by the Equity Rules in 1912.182  Now, we 
would call it a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the bill for failure to state a claim for which relief 
could be granted—a contention that goes to the merits.183  As to the merits, moreover, recall that 
Bowersock agreed that the purchase of farm bonds would violate state law.184  In that way, too, 
he plainly showed that he had no desire to box the case out of court.   He wanted to engage and 
defeat Bullitt’s constitutional claims. 
The heavy lifting on the defense side was done by counsel for the intervenor federal 
banks.  Since Charles Evans Hughes had already produced a favorable legal opinion on the 
validity of the Act, it is no surprise that the Farm Loan Board retained him to represent the Land 
Banks.185  Nor is it surprising (really) that George Wickersham and William McAdoo appeared 
for the Joint Stock Banks and McAdoo for the United States as amicus.   Both had just left the 
Administration, and McAdoo had been vitally involved in drafting the Act and starting the new 
scheme in motion.186   The attorneys for the defense focused exclusively on the constitutional 
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challenge—to the extent that they made suggestions for brushing up the original complaint to 
“more fully present the case” against their own position.187    
 The district judge, Arba S. Van Valkenburgh, was also a man of parts.   He had been 
appointed by President Taft after gaining fame as the prosecutor in major suits to enforce the 
Elkins Act (which protected railroads from demands for rebates).  His work in Smith was 
perfunctory, but for good reason.  Van Valkenburgh understood perfectly well that the parties 
planned to take this test case to the Supreme Court and frankly said as much at the end of the 
proceedings.  He compared a trial court in a case of this kind to a railway platform.  The court’s 
decision was “not for the purpose of standing upon, but for the purpose of getting into the 
Supreme Court.”188   
Van Valkenburgh scheduled an early hearing on Bowersock’s motion. The primary facts 
were not in dispute; the constitutional questions could hardly have been more hotly contested.  
Bowersock opened with a statement of the issues; McAdoo followed with a description of the 
Act and its operative features; then Hughes, Wickersham, and McAdoo engaged with Bullitt 
over the points Hughes had made in his opinion for the bond houses.   
In reply to Hughes’ contention that the Act could rest on Congress’ powers to tax, spend, 
and borrow, Bullitt insisted that Land Banks were not primarily mechanisms by which the 
Government disposed of its own treasure for the general welfare or managed its own finances.  
They were private entities that generated funds from private sources, operated for the benefit of 
farmers and investors, and served no genuine public purpose.  Joint Stock Banks, which received 
no Government funds, were even less defensible.189   Hughes himself acknowledged that Joint 
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Stock Banks might be in a different category and noted that their status raised a “separable” 
issue.190     
 For their part, Wickersham and McAdoo denied any signal difference between Land 
Banks and Joint Stock Banks for constitutional purposes.  True, Congress’ powers to tax, spend, 
and borrow were less in evidence in the case of Joint Stock Banks.  Yet Wickersham and 
McAdoo maintained that the public functions they performed (or, at least, could perform) were 
not eclipsed by their largely private character and activities.  Joint Stock Banks shared numerous 
features with Land Banks, not the least of which was the pervasive supervision the Farm Loan 
Board exercised with respect to both.    
 Speaking for the Government, McAdoo endorsed the arguments in the other briefs and 
added two more.191  He contended that the Land Banks and Joint Stock Banks  were 
indistinguishable constitutionally from ordinary national banks, which had existed for a half-
century and whose constitutional footing had long since been sustained.192  And he argued that 
the Farm Loan Act could rest on an alternative ground: Congress’ authority to declare and make 
war.193  The United States had not yet formally entered hostilities when the Act was adopted.  
But, by McAdoo’s account, the country was preparing for the dislocations the war would 
entail—which included potential disruptions in the food supply.   
 At the end of the second day, Judge Van Valkenburgh dealt with the constitutional 
arguments from the bench.  He had “no question” regarding the validity of the Land Banks “in 
any respect.”194  He acknowledged that the Joint Stock Banks were arguably distinguishable.  
Yet they, too, might be made financial agents of the Government and depositaries of its funds.  If 
they were to be struck out of the Act, the Supreme Court itself would have to make the decision.  
Then and there, Van Valkenburgh declared both the Land Banks and the Joint Stock Banks 
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constitutionally valid and informed the parties that the bill would be “dismissed for want of 
equity.”195   
D. The Supreme Court 
With Judge Van Valkenburgh’s decision in place, the parties were anxious to get on with 
the appeal—which by statute went directly to the Supreme Court.196  Bullitt filed a motion to 
advance the case on the Supreme Court’s docket, and all the defendants’ attorneys signed it.  
Their reasoning was plain.  The crucial issue was the constitutionality of tax exemptions for farm 
loan bonds; bonds said to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars were on the table; banks, 
investors, and borrowers were in turmoil while any uncertainty continued.  The validity of the 
tax exemptions depended, in turn, on the constitutionality of the 1916 Act itself, and the district 
court order cleanly presented that question.197  The Court at first obliged.  The appeal was 
docketed in November and scheduled for argument two months later.   
 In 1920, the Supreme Court heard arguments in the Old Senate Chamber, an elegant, 
semicircular room in the Capitol building with a thick brown carpet, velvet-cushioned seating, 
and marble busts of former chief justices along the wall behind the raised bench at which the 
justices were seated.198  On this occasion, one chair was vacant.  Justice Brandeis would not 
participate.  There is no surviving (reliable) explanation.  The personal relationship between 
Brandeis and Hughes could not have been the cause.  The two were old friends; many years 
earlier, their law firms had worked on cases together.199  But Hughes obviously knew most of the 
justices from his own days on the Court.  And he appeared in other cases that prompted no 
recusals—including one decided on the same day that Smith came down.200   By one account, 
Brandeis recused himself because he personally held farm loan bonds.201   
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The argument consumed three days.  The lawyers and justices fastened their attention on 
the constitutional issues.202  At one point, Justice McReynolds interrupted to ask whether it was 
all so clear that the case was properly before the Court.203  Apart from that, there appeared to be 
no reason why the justices would not render a quick decision on the merits.  It did not happen.  
Three months passed, and on the last day of the Term the Court restored the case to the docket 
and ordered reargument the following year.   
The lawyers were perplexed.  They had labored to obtain a decision on the constitutional 
questions as soon as possible.  The Court had seemed willing, but now there was evidently some 
snag.  No reason was given for the postponement, and there is no surviving evidence of what the 
justices were thinking.  Wickersham later speculated that they wanted more time to consider 
subject matter jurisdiction.204   But the parties were not asked for briefing on that point—and 
they, in fact, provided none.   They dutifully asked that the reargument at least should be 
expedited.205  And they prepared revised briefs that amounted to a reprise of their positions on 
the merits.   
Only Bullitt touched on the “propriety” of the case “to test the grave constitutional 
questions.”  He made no real argument, but only directed the Court’s attention to Brushaber and 
offered “remarks” that “while probably unnecessary” were “prompted by” the “passing inquiry” 
from McReynolds at oral argument.  Bullitt said only that the “propriety of the proceedings” had 
never been contested below and all the lawyers now wanted the Court to determine “the validity 
of the legislation.”206  This was not to contend that subject matter jurisdiction existed because the 
parties had consented.  No one would have proposed that.   The citation to Brushaber suggests 
that Bullitt had in mind federal equity jurisdiction—a matter that the defense could waive.  
Probably, Bullitt only meant to whistle past any jurisdictional graveyard and to discourage the 
justices from ducking the constitutional questions.  It was late, everybody was tired, and no one 
wanted to go home without a resolution of the issues all had come to Washington to resolve.  
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The Court took two more days of argument the following October—with no (recorded) special 
attention to jurisdiction.  Then, in February of 1921, Justice Day delivered the Court’s decision. 
 William Rufus Day was a Republican from Ohio, born to a family of lawyers and judges.  
His father had been Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court.  Day himself had a general 
practice in Canton, where he befriended and advised William McKinley, who later named Day 
Secretary of State in the middle of the Spanish American War.  When Theodore Roosevelt failed 
to persuade William Howard Taft to take a position on the Supreme Court in 1903, he named 
Day as an acceptable Ohio alternative.207  On the Court, Justice Day had a deserved reputation 
for conservative views regarding congressional power; he generally insisted that the Commerce 
Clause authorized only the regulation of transportation.208   Yet he was not among the Court’s 
most doctrinaire defenders of corporate practices; he generally approved vigorous enforcement 
of the antitrust laws.209  An admiring biographer contends that Day was a voice of moderation.   
He “instructively grasped . . . the importance of the ever-increasing concentration of corporate 
power.”210   
Justice Day first satisfied himself regarding subject matter jurisdiction before going on to 
the merits.  In light of the precedents then in place, it is hardly surprising that he confirmed the 
district court’s jurisdiction and, in turn, the Supreme Court’s own jurisdiction on direct review—
bracketing for the moment Justice Holmes’ position in dissent.  On the basic question whether § 
24 conferred jurisdiction on the district court, Day might simply have adopted the dictum in 
Hawes.211  Day invoked the “general rule” that § 24 jurisdiction was sustained if the plaintiff’s 
“right to relief” depended on “the construction or application of the Constitution”—provided the 
claim was “not merely colorable” and rested on a “reasonable foundation.”212  He cited nothing 
for that rule, apart from similar language in Osborn, where (Day conceded) the Court had 
described the outer boundaries of federal-question jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 
III—this is to say, the jurisdiction Congress had constitutional power to confer on federal courts 
rather than the jurisdiction Congress had actually granted.   
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 Beyond Osborn, Day relied on the income tax cases, Pollock and Brushaber, albeit he 
acknowledged that both had been diversity actions.  Those decisions, he explained, established 
two points.  The first was immaterial in Smith.  Day recalled that Pollock and Brushaber had 
held that § 3224 posed no bar to a shareholder invoking federal equity jurisdiction to enjoin a 
corporation from paying an allegedly unconstitutional tax.213  Fair enough.  But then the 
shareholder in Smith was not trying to keep the Trust Company from paying taxes, only from 
buying bonds on the promise they were tax free.   
 Second, Day recalled that, in Brushaber, the Court had reviewed a district court judgment 
directly pursuant to § 238, leapfrogging over the relevant circuit court of appeals on the theory 
that the validity of a federal statute was drawn in question.  This point was pertinent, given that 
the shareholder in Smith also invoked § 238 to obtain immediate Supreme Court review.  Still, 
the (noncontroversial) proposition in Brushaber that § 238 secured appellate jurisdiction for the 
Supreme Court (ceteris paribus) proved nothing about the district court’s original jurisdiction 
below.  If the district court in Smith had acted without original jurisdiction under § 24, no one 
would have thought that § 238 could bootstrap appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court 
simply because the case involved the constitutionality of a federal statute.  In his dissent, Holmes 
said only that he saw nothing in Brushaber that was “contrary to” his views and that his own 
objection to the district court’s jurisdiction in Smith had not been “before the mind of the Court 
[in Brushaber] or the subject of any of its observations.”214   
 Turning to the merits, Justice Day bypassed Hughes’ primary argument that Congress 
could create the new federal scheme for rural credit under its power to tax and spend for the 
general welfare.   He focused, instead, on Hughes’ second contention, also grounded in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, that Congress could establish public institutions, including these new 
banks, as instruments for handling the Federal Government’s financial affairs.  In this, Day 
seized upon the provisions that Congress had placed in the Act for the sole purpose of giving him 
something to seize upon—namely, the provisions giving Treasury authority to designate the 
banks as financial agents of the United States and depositaries of Government funds.215   Day 
took what Congress gave him despite the certain knowledge that it had precious little to do with 
the basic thrust of the program the Act brought into being.  It was beside the point that Treasury 
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had never exercised the authority to employ Federal Land Banks and Joint Stock Banks in aid of 
the Government’s own financial operations.  It was sufficient that the authority existed.216 
On the surface, this was surprising.  John Marshall had declared in McCulloch that 
Congress could not rest legislation on a pretext.217   Day himself had written the Court’s 
notorious opinion in the Child Labor Case, invalidating a prohibition on the interstate shipment 
of goods manufactured with child labor on the ground that the true purpose was to discourage the 
exploitation of children.218  But more recently, in United States v. Doremus,219 Day had said that 
if legislation enacted by Congress had a “reasonable relation” to the taxing authority, it could not 
be struck down “because of the supposed motives which induced it.”220  It was clear enough in 
Smith that Congress had created federally chartered banks to make loans to farmers, but here, 
too, the true purpose of congressional action was immaterial.    
 One may say that Day took the path of least resistance in Smith and avoided the more 
expansive argument that Congress could do precisely what everyone understood the Act was 
meant to do—that is, charter federal institutions to make low-interest loans to farmers for the 
sole reason that Congress thought the general welfare would be served.  Yet there is a way Day’s 
approach held the potential for even more sweeping congressional power.  He disclaimed any 
authority in the Court to curb legislative policy-making by holding Congress within formal 
categories the justices themselves ascribe to the document: “With the wisdom and policy of this 
legislation we have nothing to do.”221  If Congress inserted something in a statute that supplied a 
link to a settled power, Congress was free to leverage that link to achieve much more ambitious 
goals.   
***** 
                                                 
216 255 U.S. at 210.  Hughes recalled Day’s opinion this way in famous lectures delivered at 
Columbia in 1927.  CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
102 (1927). 
217 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423.    
218 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
219 249 U.S. 86 (1919). 
220 Id. at 93-94.  
221 Smith, 255 U.S. at 213. 
46 
 
 The constitutionality of the 1916 Act was now settled.  Next day, the Farm Loan Board 
announced that it would immediately authorize the issuance of all the bonds that had already 
been approved but had been held up while the Smith case was pending.222   
III. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Revisited 
Since it was so plain to the lawyers that the district court’s jurisdiction could rest on § 24, 
and since Justice Day’s opinion for the Supreme Court confirmed that understanding, one may 
wonder why the jurisdictional issue in Smith still attracts attention.   The explanation is that 
Day’s reasoning is thought to clash with the modern Court’s treatment of federal-question 
jurisdiction under § 1331.  The Court now rationalizes the result Day reached, but embraces what 
it understands Justice Holmes to have meant as the baseline rule from which Day (in hindsight) 
justifiably departed.  According to the Court, Holmes articulated the right general approach, but 
reached the wrong conclusion in the case at hand.    
The Court has it that, in general, a civil action “arises” under federal law for purposes of 
§ 1331 only if the plaintiff’s authority to sue is federal.  The law that must be federal is the law 
that provides the plaintiff’s vehicle for seeking judicial relief.  The Court is convinced that this 
interpretation of §1331 works well enough most of the time, though it has some odd 
implications.223   Moreover, the Court insists this understanding has solid support in precedents 
stretching back to Holmes, who initially declared in Well Works, and repeated in Smith, that a 
suit “arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”224  By the Court’s account, a “cause of 
action” is not a litigant’s substantive claim (the alleged violation of law with which the plaintiff 
charges the defendant), but the authority bestowed on the litigant to press a claim in court (the 
litigant’s entitlement to ask for a judicial remedy).225   
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This focus on the source of a litigant’s ability to pursue judicial relief can be explained as 
a matter of policy or, if you like, as a reflection of the Court’s view that it is for Congress to 
make the policy decision whether jurisdiction should be conferred on federal courts.  The text of 
§ 1331 invites the interpretation that any case implicating a federal issue is within a district 
court’s power to hear.  But the Court hesitates to say that Congress has opened the district courts’ 
doors so widely.  So the justices demand a better basis for concluding that Congress genuinely 
wants to grant federal courts original jurisdiction to adjudicate private suits in a particular 
context—a better basis, this is to say, than the bare language of § 1331.  Firmer ground is 
generally supplied by Congress’ authorization of private suits.  If Congress enables private 
actions, the Court takes Congress to contemplate that district courts will have subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain them.   
If Congress fails to authorize private litigation, the Court as a rule infers that Congress 
does not want § 1331 jurisdiction to exist.  That inference is defeated, however, if other 
circumstances indicate that § 1331 jurisdiction is warranted and within Congress’ contemplation, 
despite the absence of a private “cause of action” that would seal the deal alone.  The Court 
spelled those circumstances out in Grable.226  Jurisdiction can rest on § 1331 even though the 
plaintiff’s authority to sue is supplied by state law—if the suit raises a nonfrivolous question of 
federal law, if the federal issue is actually contested and “substantial” in the sense that it entails a 
“serious interest” in “the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum 
offers,” and if federal-question jurisdiction can be recognized without upsetting any 
“congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”227   
 This is the way the Court saves the jurisdictional holding in Smith.  The Court 
acknowledges that Holmes was correct regarding the general rule that jurisdiction exists only if 
the plaintiff’s authority to sue is grounded in federal law and takes the view that Justice Day’s 
holding that jurisdiction was established could not rest on that general proposition for want of a 
federal statute permitting the shareholder action.228   Nevertheless, federal jurisdiction could still 
be secured, because the Grable tests were satisfied.  The shareholder advanced a serious 
challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute, the parties fiercely disputed the merits, the 
constitutional questions were best addressed originally in federal rather than state court, and 
there was no reason to think that federal jurisdiction threatened any discernible congressional 
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expectation that attacks on the 1916 Act would be litigated in state court.229   So Holmes was 
right in general but wrong in particular.  The Smith case was an exception to the general 
proposition that federal-question jurisdiction turns on the plaintiff’s federal authorization to take 
his or her complaint to court. 
This rationalization of Smith has excited a reevaluation of the jurisdictional issue in this 
old case.  Recent scholarship has done two things, neither of them threatening to the Court’s 
modern position.   
First, it has been demonstrated that the parties in Smith were justified in thinking that 
subject matter jurisdiction was secure.  At the time, jurisdiction was commonly sustained when 
plaintiffs raised federal questions in actions that were almost certainly conceived to be warranted 
by nonfederal law.  The authority for private suits was often unstated.  Many probably went 
forward under local law, more perhaps under uniform federal principles of equity and the general 
law applied in the federal courts prior to Erie.230  The Smith case itself may be understood, in 
hindsight, as a general-law action.231  This is not to suggest that the authority to sue in Smith was 
federal, after all.  The “federal general common law”232 disclaimed in Erie was federal in the 
sense that it was applied in the federal courts—not  in the sense that it might have justified 
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federal-question jurisdiction apart from diversity.233  The lesson from the old precedents is that 
the absence of a federal statute expressly sanctioning private suits was not generally thought to 
be telling, or even worth passing notice.234      
 The revelation that the jurisdictional holding in Smith conformed to conventional 
thinking in its own time obviously challenges the modern tendency to see Smith as an aberration.  
But it poses no serious threat to the Court’s position that federal-question jurisdiction today 
should ordinarily turn on the foundation of the plaintiff’s ability to sue.  It appears that Smith had 
more company than was previously thought, so Smith is a harder precedent to reconcile even as 
an acceptable outlier.  But that is no great difficulty.  No one thinks Supreme Court precedents in 
this or any context are so continuous as the justices make them out to be.   
 The second thing recent scholarship has done is to recover a familiar and unremarkable 
characteristic of Holmes’ thinking—namely, that Holmes himself  regarded a litigant’s 
entitlement to go to court to vindicate a substantive claim as inseparable from the legal claim the 
litigant went to court to vindicate.235  One may say that Holmes embraced the idea inherent in the 
common law that there could be no right without a remedy—meaning a judicial remedy.  The 
common law was largely a body of individual rights and correlative duties.  The only law to be 
enforced was one person’s duty to respect another’s rights, and the only institution available to 
enforce that law was a court.  So there was no occasion to differentiate a plaintiff’s argument 
about the lawfulness of a defendant’s conduct from his or her entitlement to ask a court for help.  
A legal argument was intelligible only if it could be advanced by means of a private suit.   
Now then, common law thinking may have been more formalistic.  Authoritative 
commentaries drew the very distinction Holmes denied between primary rights and remedial 
rights, albeit they recognized that the two necessarily functioned together hand in glove.  So 
when Holmes insisted that there was only one idea at work, he may have been articulating his 
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own peculiar jurisprudence or, perhaps, signaling resistance to the disintegration of claims and 
judicial remedies he perceived to be under way in American law.236    
This insight into Holmes’ thinking would seem to undercut the modern Court’s reliance 
on Holmes for the general proposition that federal-question jurisdiction turns on the source of the 
plaintiff’s authority for bringing suit.  If Holmes saw no difference between claims and the 
entitlement to seek a judicial remedy for claims, it is hard to cite him for the view that the 
authority to sue was a separate matter that had to be federal if jurisdiction was to be triggered.  
Yet academicians who come this far with Holmes tend to draw the conclusion that Holmes is a 
fair citation for the modern Court’s ends.  This is the way the story goes. 
The two ideas recovered in recent scholarship (the routine recognition of federal 
jurisdiction when federal substantive claims were advanced and Holmes’ rejection of any 
distinction between substantive claims and the ability to take them to court) explain the 
difference between Day and Holmes in more or less the way the modern Court does.  Justice 
Day, for his part, adhered to the prevailing view that the federal character of a plaintiff’s properly 
pleaded claim established federal-question jurisdiction.  Day, it is contended, did not pause to 
consider the source of the shareholder’s authority to ask the courts to do something for him if his 
claim was meritorious—because (to Day) it did not matter.  All that did matter for purposes of 
subject matter jurisdiction was that the argument itself was federal.  Justice Holmes, so the story 
goes, thought it was nonsense to discuss a legal argument in the abstract, apart from the meaning 
it enjoyed as a means of obtaining judicial relief.  So in practical effect Holmes introduced the 
plaintiff’s vehicle for seeking a judicial remedy as an additional consideration—even as he 
denied that a litigation-authorizing vehicle was separable from the argument at all.237   
It is possible to read Holmes’ dissent to say that federal jurisdiction was wanting, because 
federal law supplied no “remedies” for shareholders in Smith’s position.238  This is to say, 
Holmes thought the source of the authority to sue was critical to jurisdiction, and he complained 
that Day refused to look beyond the abstract claim that the bonds were unlawful.  Yet there is 
another interpretation, indeed, another understanding of the Smith case as a whole, that is more 
plausible and more in keeping with the ostensible purpose of the Day and Holmes opinions to 
engage each other on the jurisdictional question.  Recall Holmes’ language specifically:   
If the Missouri law authorizes or forbids the investment according to the determination of 
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this Court upon a point under the Constitution or Acts of Congress, still that point is 
material only because the Missouri law saw fit to make it so. The whole foundation of the 
duty is Missouri law, which at its sole will incorporated the other law as it might 
incorporate a document.  The other law or document depends for its relevance and effect 
not on its own force but upon the law that took it up, so I repeat once more the cause of 
action arises wholly from the law of the State. . . . It may be enough that the law relied 
upon creates a part of the cause of action although not the whole, as held in [Osborn]. . . . 
But the law must create at least a part of the cause of action by its own force, for it is the 
suit, not a question in the suit, that must arise under the law of the United States. The 
mere adoption by a State law of a United States law as a criterion or test, when the law of 
the United States has no force proprio vigore, does not cause a case under the State law 
to be also a case under the law of the United States. . . .239 
The starting point for this alternative account is the notorious ambiguity of the “cause of 
action” phrase.240  Today, that label is attached to the vehicle on which a plaintiff rests his or her 
entitlement to seek judicial relief.  The Court reads Justice Holmes to have given the “cause of 
action” formulation the same meaning.  But scholarship has shown the Court’s understanding to 
be wrong.  Holmes did not recognize a litigant’s authority to sue as a question separate from his 
or her legal argument.  According to this alternative account of Smith, neither did Justice Day.  
He, too, declared that “the jurisdiction of the District Court depend[ed] on whether the cause of 
action set forth [arose] under the Constitution….”241     
We must open our minds to the possibility that Day, as well as Holmes, treated the 
substantive legal claim and the shareholder’s ability to take it to court as one and the same.  The 
latter was a necessary feature of the former, requiring no separate investigation.   So it is not that 
Day slid past the source of the shareholder’s authority to sue the Trust Company and that Holmes 
called Day back to that issue.  When Day and Holmes used the “cause of action” phrase, neither 
meant to introduce the plaintiff’s authority to sue as an independent matter.  Both used “cause of 
action” to mean the legal argument—the claim.   The law that had to be federal was the law that 
created a plaintiff’s legal argument, the law that governed the parties’ primary behavior, the law 
the plaintiff insisted the defendant was violating, the law that allegedly made the defendant’s 
behavior a legal wrong, the law that a federal court would be asked to use as a rule of decision. 
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By this account, the difference between Day and Holmes was over whether the 
shareholder’s claim was genuinely federal.  Day thought so, because the district court would 
have to determine a federal constitutional question to resolve it.  A state claim incorporating a 
federal element was federal within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute.242  Holmes thought 
not.  He agreed that the action arose under the law that supported the claim—the substantive law 
the district court would use to resolve the dispute.  But, in his mind, that was state law alone.  
The only duty the shareholder charged the Trust Company with violating was a duty established 
by state law.  The state-law nature of the company’s duty did not change merely because state 
law incorporated federal law as its content.  Still, the alleged breach of a state duty made out only 
a state law claim.  When Holmes said it was the suit, not a question in the suit, that must be 
federal, he did not mean the vehicle for seeking judicial relief rather than the claim the 
shareholder employed the vehicle to advance.  He meant the claim rather than an issue embedded 
in the claim.243     
This explanation does conflict with the modern Court’s understanding inasmuch as it 
leaves the source of the plaintiff’s authority to sue entirely out of the picture.  Moreover, it may 
be off-putting in that it makes Holmes (of all people) sound formalistic.  Everyone understood 
that Missouri law provided only the outer shell of the claim in Smith and that the real issue 
dividing the parties was the constitutionality of the tax exemptions for farm bonds.  Yet Holmes 
himself often acknowledged the need for comparatively rigid rules that supply predictability 
when needed.244  Moreover, the modern Court’s (mis)understanding of Holmes in this context is 
typically justified, in part, on the ground that it provides a comparatively fixed, administrable 
means of ascertaining jurisdiction at the court house door.245   
The more serious objection is that this view of Holmes makes him blind to the practical 
implications of his position.  If the Court had held in Smith that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction, the only consequence would have been delay.  Bullitt would have backed up, filed 
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essentially the same suit in state court, and ultimately returned to the Supreme Court on direct 
review of a state court judgment.246  In the meantime, a bad situation would only have become 
worse.  The value of outstanding farm bonds would have plummeted even more, and the market 
for more bond sales would have disintegrated.  The country was already suffering dislocations 
brought on by the war and could scarcely afford further unsettlement in the economy.  The Court 
had already postponed action on the case for months, apparently to hear Holmes out.  By the 
winter of 1921, it was time to clear the air. 
 None of this is to broach the question whether jurisdiction under § 1331 should generally 
turn on whether Congress has authorized private litigation.  Today, of course, judicial remedies 
for legal wrongs are not indispensable in every instance.  There are lots of alternative 
mechanisms by which to implement federal law—for example, agency enforcement.  
Accordingly, the authorization (or not) of private litigation presents an independent policy 
decision in every context.  The Court, for its part, now wants Congress actually to address and 
decide whether to include private lawsuits in the mix, if not as the primary means of enforcement 
then as supplemental to public mechanisms.  Congress may exclude private actions lest they 
interfere with administrative schemes and the exercise of discretion by responsible officials.  
Then, too, Congress may withhold authority for private litigation as part of the compromise 
necessary to agreement on substantive provisions.  Bluntly stated, a minority may acquiesce in a 
program in chief but use its political muscle to attack at the flank by denying the new law this 
familiar, and typically effective, means of enforcement.  There is a rich literature on these policy 
questions and the ideological influences at work.   
This biography of the old Smith case offers no insight into the wisdom of the Court’s 
current agenda.  Suffice it to say that the argument for making congressional authorization of 
suits the key to federal-question jurisdiction is most powerful with respect to the enforcement of 
federal law for which Congress itself is responsible.  The Court no longer finds “causes of 
action” implicit in federal statutes and demands, instead, explicit provisions.247  This on the 
theory that Congress should decide how its own legislative programs should be implemented.  
Making jurisdiction turn on the same fulcrum is at least consistent.  A similar argument cannot 
so easily explain the Court’s treatment of private suits advancing federal constitutional claims of 
right.248  Suits attacking the constitutionality of congressional schemes are farther afield.  It 
would be dangerous to let Congress mind the door alone when its own law-making is challenged.  
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Then again, the Court has not done that and, indeed, has rationalized an exception to its general 
rule in cases like Smith—for the good reasons the Grable criteria bring to light.  
What should be clear, however, is that the idea for which Smith is now known, that is, the 
idea that federal-question jurisdiction rarely exists in the absence of a federal statute authorizing 
private suits, is ahistorical.  Recent scholarship demonstrates that when Smith was decided the 
Supreme Court commonly found federal-question jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s remedial right 
was nonfederal.   But the truth lies deeper.  The whole notion that a private litigant’s entitlement 
to pursue judicial relief constitutes a separate, threshold issue distinct from a legal claim is an 
artifact of the administrative state.  This is not an idea that can be retrofitted.  It cannot, or at 
least should not, be imposed on the world as it was before the emergence of the modern menu of 
enforcement mechanisms from which Congress makes choices.   When Smith was decided, the 
working assumption was that private lawsuits were the only game in town.  
 
Epilogue 
The subsequent history of the federal banks approved in Smith was peaks and valleys.  
Many more Joint Stock Banks were chartered (about 87 over the life of the program), most were 
profitable during World War I, but all suffered in the post-war economic decline.249  In 1923, 
Congress limited the size of Joint Stock Bank loans to $50,000 and restricted their purpose to 
agricultural projects.  When the crash came in 1929, the Government provided emergency 
assistance to Land Banks, but not to Joint Stock Banks.  The Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
loaned some funds to Joint Stock Banks, but not enough money to save them.  In short order, 
they began to fail.  The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 created a number of new federal 
institutions to supply rural credit, but provided for the liquidation of all the Joint Stock Banks 
still standing.250 
Federal Land Banks survived the post-war period and then made much-needed loans 
during the Great Depression.  In 1933, President Roosevelt abolished the Farm Loan Board and 
transferred its supervisory responsibility for Land Banks to a new Farm Credit Administration.251   
Over succeeding decades, numerous reorganization plans perpetuated Land Banks along with 
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other rural credit entities.252  Land Banks were still in existence on their fiftieth anniversary in 
1967,253 but public funding for loans to farmers was diminishing fast.254  The Agricultural Credit 
Act of 1987 collapsed the Land Banks into Farm Credit Banks.255   
Shareholder suits continued to serve as instruments by which corporations unable to sue 
straightforwardly to advance their economic interests could challenge competing public 
institutions by proxy.  In his famous concurrence in the Ashwander case, Justice Brandeis 
worried aloud that individuals suing as shareholders could challenge federal regulatory programs 
even when corporations themselves failed to do so (at least formally).  Brandeis recognized the 
threat to social welfare policy and so contended that the policing of corporate boards should 
generally be left to public officials.256   Yet the full Court was content with the shareholder 
model and, in Ashwander itself, explicitly relaxed the standards for derivative actions that had 
been in place when Smith was decided.257  Shareholder suits figured in some of the most famous 
attacks on federal legislation before and during the New Deal.  The Carter Coal case was a 
shareholder suit,258 as was the Social Security case, Helvering v. Davis.259  
  The principal players in Smith passed on to other notable pursuits.  Charles Evans Hughes 
became Secretary of State in the Harding Administration.  Then Herbert Hoover named him 
                                                 
252 W. GIFFORD HOAG, THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SELF-HELP 1-2 
(1976). 
253 Tootell, supra note 22, at 557-61. 
254 Warren F. Lee & George D. Irwin, Restructuring the Farm Credit System: A Progress Report, 
56 AGRIC. FIN. REV. 1, 7 (1996).    
255 Id. at 9; see also Farrell E. Jensen, The Farm Credit System as a Government-Sponsored 
Enterprise, 22 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 226, 328 (2000) (listing the putative purposes of the change); 
KENNETH L. PEOPLES, ANATOMY OF AN AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL CREDIT CRISIS: FARM 
DEBT IN THE 1980S, 75-89 (1992) (offering more background). 
256 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment). 
257 Id. at 318-319 (majority opinion) (holding that it was unnecessary to show that company 
directors’ actions were ultra vires and that the necessary “illegality” could be found “in the lack 
of lawful authority on the part of those with whom the corporation [was] attempting to deal”—
namely, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of the TVA). 
258 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).    
259 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
56 
 
Chief Justice in 1930.  It is tempting to say that Hughes’ experience in Smith influenced his 
attitude toward congressional power on his return to the Court.  But his briefs on behalf of 
Federal Land Banks contended, and needed to contend, only that Congress could create public 
entities to finance agriculture carried on privately—not that Congress could regulate the industry 
in fine detail, far less actually “conduct agricultural activities.”260  So Hughes could write for the 
Court without embarrassment in the Sick Chicken Case, Schechter Poultry, one of infamous 
Black Monday decisions that precipitated the confrontation with FDR over New Deal 
legislation.261   
Then again, Hughes wrote the majority opinion in Ashwander, delivered less than a year 
later.  There, too, he was cautious, declining to face the question whether the very existence of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority was constitutional.  But he did address and sustain the TVA’s 
construction and operation of the great Wilson Dam and the sale of electric power throughout the 
region.  The plaintiffs contended that if Congress could create a public institution with those 
authorities, then Congress must be able to engage in other kinds of business (steel manufacturing 
to shoe making).  To that, Hughes responded that he would decide only the case at hand.  It was 
Justice McReynolds, in dissent, who insisted that Congress had no power to authorize the TVA 
“or any other federal agency” to engage in such far-reaching commercial activities.262  Of course, 
Hughes also wrote for the Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel, which by all accounts (apart from his 
own) largely repudiated the analysis in Schechter and marked the Court’s essential capitulation 
to Roosevelt and the New Deal Congress.263  The rest, as they say, is history.   
George Wickersham assumed a variety of roles as a senior statesman.  He was for a time 
President of the Council on Foreign Relations.  He is remembered today as chair of the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, the first systematic investigation of law 
enforcement in the United States.  The Wickersham Commission’s multi-volume report 
described widespread police misconduct, particularly harsh interrogation methods, as well as 
                                                 
260 Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 26, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. (1921) 
(disclaiming such a power).   
261 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
262 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 371-372 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
263 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).  See THURMOND ARNOLD, THE 
FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 339 (1937).  Cf. F.D.G. Ribble, The Constitutional Doctrines of Chief 
Justice Hughes, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1199 (1941) (describing Hughes’ apparent shift as “in 
no sense an about face” but rather “an adjustment of a scale”).  Hughes himself denied any 
cause-and-effect relationship between the court-packing plan and the course of the Court’s 
decisions.  AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, supra note 185, at 311-313. 
57 
 
political corruption.  The Commission documented the many failings of Prohibition, but declined 
to recommend its repeal (suffering no end of ridicule for its lack of resolve).264  
William McAdoo, the “father” of the Farm Loan Act and its most vigorous proponent, 
entered politics in his own right.  His name was placed in nomination for the presidency in 1920, 
but his heart wasn’t in it.265  Four years later, he battled Al Smith for the nomination at the 
marathon convention that ultimately settled on John W. Davis.266  In 1933, McAdoo was elected 
to the Senate from California.   
Judge Van Valkenburgh handled a number of other important cases, including Missouri 
v. Holland.267  During World War I, he presided at the trials of Communist Party members.  
Later, President Coolidge appointed Van Valkenburgh to the circuit bench.  Justice Day, always 
a frail man, retired from the Court a year after the Smith decision and died the year after that.  
William Marshall Bullitt continued his career as a corporate litigator.  He became 
principal counsel to the Whiskey Trust and made one of the arguments in National Prohibition 
Cases.268  His prized store of mathematical materials can now be found in the University of 
Louisville Library.  Near the end of his career, Bullitt was actively engaged in the Alger Hiss 
affair.  He composed a survey of the congressional hearings, which painted an unflattering 
picture of Hiss.269 The year before his death, Bullitt was the victim of what was then the largest 
theft of cash in American history.270  At the last, the former champion of private banks was 
unwilling to trust his own money to their keeping. 
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